TERRORISM IN NIGERIA - REVISITING NIGERIA'S SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ANDREW PONFA WUYEP, MAJOR, NIGERIAN ARMY
Bsc, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
12-06-2015	Master's Thesis	AUG 2014 – JUN 2015

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Terrorism in Nigeria - Revisiting Nigeria's Socio-Political Approach to Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Andrew Ponfa Wuyep, Major

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Boko Haram, is a terrorist organization in Nigeria, with its stronghold in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (Nigeria). The group has conducted series of attacks that has resulted in a high level of insecurity in the country, deaths and a high number of refugees in the affected region. In addition, the menace of terrorism has negatively impacted the socio-economic and political equilibrium of Nigeria, making it the current thorn in the nation's flesh. This research tries to highlight the need for a socio-political approach in Nigeria's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy in order to make it more effective. Methodologically, it relies on both primary and secondary sources of data. It argues that a combination of politico-economic competition, illiteracy, poverty, extremist religious ideology and the obnoxious military extra-judicial killings are the core drivers of this sudden change. It concludes with a range of recommendations on how Nigeria can successfully address the security threat posed by Boko Haram.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Terror, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, Direct Approach, Indirect Approach, Nigeria, Nigerian Government, Boko Haram, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and COIN forces

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	131	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Andrew Ponfa Wuyep

Thesis Title: Terrorism in Nigeria - Revisiting Nigeria's Socio-Political Approach to Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Douglas E. Lathrop, M.A.

_____, Member
Michael D. Mihalka, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2015 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA - REVISITING NIGERIA'S SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY, by Major Andrew Ponfa Wuyep, 131 pages.

Boko Haram, is a terrorist organization in Nigeria, with its stronghold in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Nigeria). The group has conducted series of attacks that has resulted in a high level of insecurity in the country, deaths and a high number of refugees in the affected region. In addition, the menace of terrorism has negatively impacted the socio-economic and political equilibrium of Nigeria, making it the current thorn in the nation's flesh. This research tries to highlight the need for a socio-political approach in Nigeria's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy in order to make it more effective. Methodologically, it relies on both primary and secondary sources of data. It argues that a combination of politico-economic competition, illiteracy, poverty, extremist religious ideology and the obnoxious military extra-judicial killings are the core drivers of this sudden change. It concludes with a range of recommendations on how Nigeria can successfully address the security threat posed by Boko Haram.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, my gratitude goes to the Almighty God for the gift of life, health, favor in my career, and wisdom. Without Him, I am nothing. My sincere thanks also go to my Committee Chair, Mr. Doug Lathrop ("Hakuna Matata"). Your deep knowledge about Africa helped me to understand the perspective of your critique, advise, suggestions, and guidance. Your faith in me was a motivation for the completion of this research. To the other members of my committee, Dr Mihalka and Mr. Michael Burke, I say thank you for your priceless editorial comments, suggestions and invaluable input to this research. To LTC David Loch (my Staff Group Adviser), Mr. Kevin Gentzler (Leadership), Mr. Greg Thomas, Dr Michelle Miller (Tactics) and my colleagues of Staff Group 13B. Words cannot express how grateful I am. You've all contributed to making my career a success. Your friendship, care, and input in the course of this study were exceptional. My sincere gratitude also goes to wife, my priceless treasure, Dr Godiya, and my daughter, Nanji ("Nana"), I say thank you for perseverance, endurance and prayers. God bless you. To my sponsors, specifically Mr. Jeff Muchow and MJ, I'm indebted to you for all your kindnesses, especially for the materials you periodically sent to me for this research. God bless you. To my boss and mentor, Lieutenant General OA Ihejirika (Chief of Army Staff, Nigeria, (2010–2014), thank you for the confidence you reposed in me. Your counseling and mentorship have been solid pillars to my success today. Finally, to members of my extended family in Nigeria and abroad, I say thank you and God bless you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE iii

ABSTRACT iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v

TABLE OF CONTENTS vi

ACRONYMS ix

ILLUSTRATIONS x

TABLES xi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

Rise of Jihadist Movement in Nigeria 5
Militancy and the Emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 10
Ills of Contemporary Nigerian Socio-Political System 11
Thesis Question 13
Assumptions 14
Definition of Key Terms, Ideas, and Abbreviations 14
Limitation 17
Delimitations 18

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 19

Terror 21
Terrorism 22
Types of Terrorism 24
Theories and Causes of Terrorism 24
The Foundation and Drivers of Terrorism 25
Symptoms of Terrorism 26
Root Causes of Terrorism 28
Political Godfatherism—Oga Factor 32
Alienation—Discrimination 33
Ethno-nationalism 34
Religion 34
Tackling the Root Causes and Symptoms of Terrorism Simultaneously 34
Effects of Terrorism on the Society 37
Counterterrorism Theory 37

Direct Approach 38
Indirect Approach 39
Defining the Threat to Nigeria's Unity 39
The Nigerian Government's Response 40
Summary of Chapter 2 and Preview of Chapter 3 41

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 43

Introduction 43
Qualitative Analytical Method 44
Brief Reviews of Methodology Works 46
Selected Model for Analysis 47
Binary Analysis 48
Designation of CT/COIN Effectiveness 49
Phasing of Case Studies 50
Political Dimension 53
Socio-cultural and Religious Dimension 54
Economic Dimension 56
Matrix of Analysis 58
Summary of Chapter 3 62
A Preview of the Structure of MEND and Boko Haram Case Studies in Chapter 4 63

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS 64

Boko Haram Case Study 67
Phase One: Homegrown Insurgency (2002 to July 27, 2009) 68
Phases Two: Increase in Violence and Internationalism (2010 to 2015) 70
Phase Three: Allegiance to the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) 2015 and Beyond 73
Conventional Explanations 74
Distinctive Characteristics 76
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (2005 to the Present) 79
Phase One: Pre-Amnesty, late 2005 to Summer 2009 79
Phase Two: Post-Amnesty, August 2009 to the Present 83
Conventional Explanations and Assessment 85
Assessment of Case Studies and Matrixes 89
Summary of Chapter 4 and a Preview of Chapter 5 92

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94

The Findings of Chapter 4 95
Recommendations 96
Political Dimension 96
Economic Dimension 100
Socio-Cultural Dimension 101
Summary of Recommendations 106

Conclusion 107
Relevance to Field of Study 107
Recommendations for Further Study and Analysis 108

REFERENCE LIST 111

ACRONYMS

BH	Boko Haram
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NACTEST	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NG	Nigerian Government

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. Map of West Africa Showing Nigeria 2

Figure 2. Map of Nigeria Showing the Thirty-Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 5

Figure 3. Reported Civilian Deaths in Boko Haram Attacks Sep 2010 to Apr 2014.....72

Figure 4. Oil Production and Consumption in Nigeria, 1995 to 2011 84

TABLES

Page

Table 1. Sample Matrix.....60

Table 2. Matrix for Boko Haram 77

Table 3. Matrix For MEND 87

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In earlier times, the region that has evolved into the nation of Nigeria used to be a concentration of different kingdoms and empires or caliphates. These kingdoms were bonded by religion and culture. Notably among them were the Kanem-Bornu, Benin, and Oyo Empires as well as the Sokoto Caliphate. The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 saw the merging of all these empires and kingdoms, for administrative reasons by the British government. This amalgamation saw the creation of Nigeria. Although Nigeria gained independence from Britain on October 1, 1960, the result of this amalgamation attributes to the numerous problems bedeviling the nation up to the present.

Figure 1. Map of West Africa Showing Nigeria

Source: Results, "West Africa Map," April 19, 2011, accessed June 5, 2015, http://blog.results.org.uk/2011/04/20/the-nigerian-elections-highlighting-girls-education/west-africa-map/.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous country in the World. Currently, it is Africa's largest producer of oil, and the fifth largest exporter of oil to the US (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Nigeria is a regional power, with the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its capital, Abuja. Nigeria is a significant contributor to ECOWAS and African Union (AU) initiatives throughout West Africa and Africa respectively. In 2014, Nigeria was the 8th largest troops' contributor to UN Operations (United Nations Peacekeeping 2015),

and the Nigerian Army ranks as one of the best in the continent. Economically, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, in terms of gross domestic product, surpassing South Africa (The Economist 2014). Nigeria has one of the largest youth populations in the world (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). This makes Nigeria a regional power in Africa with a vision of becoming a regional hegemony.

Carved out of West Africa by Britain with less regard for preexisting ethnic, cultural and linguistic divisions, Nigeria has often experienced an uncertain peace. Following decades of ethnic tension in colonial Nigeria, political instability reached a critical mass among independent Nigeria's three dominant ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the southwest, and Igbo in the southeast. On January 15, 1966, Nigeria witnessed its first military coup d'état, one which opened a new socio-political chapter in Nigeria's history.

Shortly after the successful coup, widespread suspicion of Igbo domination was aroused in the north among the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, many of whom opposed independence from Britain. Similar suspicions of the Igbo junta grew in the Yoruba west, prompting a joint Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani countercoup against the Igbo six months later. Further anger over the murder of prominent Hausa politicians led to the massacre of scattered Igbo populations in northern Hausa-Fulani regions. This persecution triggered the move by Igbo separatists to form their own nation of Biafra in 1967, which sparked-up the Nigerian Civil War (BlackPast.org 2015).

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, was a three-year bloody conflict (1967 to 1970), with a high death toll and damage to infrastructure. The war began with the secession of the southeastern region of the nation on May 30, 1967, when

it declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra. The ensuing battles and well-publicized human suffering prompted international outrage and intervention (BlackPast.org).

The end of a civil war was believed to be an opportunity to unite Nigerians. Yet, in the post-civil war era, Nigeria has been confronted with daunting security challenges including endemic corruption, political turmoil, militancy, insurgencies and recurring ethnic and religious violence which have pitted various communities against one another throughout the country.

After many years of military domination, the reintroduction of civilian rule in 1999 coincided with, or seems to have spurred the intensification of ethnic and religious militancy, characterized by acts of catastrophic terrorism, civil strife and mass protests. Indeed, since 1999, with the opening of the democratic space, various militia groups clinging to religion, ethnicity or other special interests have sprung up in Nigeria. The horror they have unleashed on the people can only be comparable to that of the civil war years. In addition to the terrible humanitarian toll, the activities of these groups and their conflict-prone relationship with security officials have been a constant menace to peace, security, stability and the territorial integrity of Nigeria (Bamidele 2012).



Figure 2. Map of Nigeria Showing the Thirty-Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)

Source: Artofanderson.com, "Map of Nigeria," accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.artofanderson.com/map-of-nigeria-showing-states-and-cities/.

Rise of Jihadist Movement in Nigeria

Since the pre-colonial era, the northern region of Nigeria has always been known to be a fertile ground for religious activism. In the Sokoto Caliphate (north western Nigeria), Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio (1754 to 1817) was a religious teacher, writer and Islamic promoter, and the founder of the caliphate. He was a leader who followed the

Sunni Maliki school of Islam and Qadiri branch of Sufism (The Muslim 500 2015). He waged an Islamic holy war known as a Jihad, in the early 18th century, partly because of the inability or unwillingness of the ruling elite to separate politics from religion. Since they often derived legitimacy from religion and not the people, they frequently employed religion as a political weapon for self-preservation, mass mobilization, perpetuation in office and diversion of attention from their ineptitude, corruption and incompetence (Ajayi 2012).

Dan Fodio's jihad created the largest empire in Africa since the fall of the Songhai Empire in 1591. By the middle of the 19th century, when the Sokoto Caliphate was at its greatest extent, it stretched 1,500 kilometers from Dori in modern Burkina Faso to southern Adamawa in Cameroon and included Nupe lands, Ilorin in northern Yorubaland, and much of the Benue River valley. In addition, Usman dan Fodio's jihad provided the inspiration for a series of related holy wars in other parts of the Savanna and Sahel far beyond Nigeria's borders that led to the foundation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, and Sudan. An analogy has been drawn between Usman dan Fodio's jihad and the French Revolution in terms of its widespread impact. Just as the French Revolution affected the course of European history in the 19th century, the Sokoto jihad affected the course of history throughout the savanna from Senegal to the Red Sea (Metz 1991).

Nigeria's geo-political structure is fairly complex and diversified. The largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo who account for more than seventy percent of the population. Religiously, Nigeria is a diversified society with Islam and Christianity as the major religions. The far northern states are overwhelmingly Muslim,

and the southeast and south-south are just as clearly Christian. The religiously mixed states of the north central and southwest are also politically mixed. Overall, Nigeria is by far the largest country in the world with religious identities evenly divided between Muslims (90 million) and Christians (90 million). This raises the question of the relationship of religious identities and voting patterns (Paden 2015).

The Dan Fodio-led jihad in the 19th century pushed Islam into Nupe and across the Niger River into northern Yoruba-speaking areas. The colonial conquest established a rule that active Christian proselytizing could not occur in the northern Muslim region, although in 1990 the two religions continued to compete for converts in the middle belt, where ethnic groups and even families had adherents of each persuasion (Metz 1991). In general, the country is seen as having a predominantly Muslim north and a non-Muslim primarily Christian south, with each as a minority faith in the other's region; the middle belt is more heterogeneous.

While the ruling elites in the Southern region of Nigeria, which is predominantly Christian, have been patronizing Christianity for selfish political gains their Northern counterparts have also been manipulating Islam for the same purpose. But the situation in the North is more manifest because of its relatively monolithic character; a situation brought about first by the Jihad and later by colonialism. Ever since many fundamentalist religious groups, the most prominent being the Maitatsine sect, evolved to confront the pretentious ruling elites through several religious uprisings (Oyovbaire 1980). The Maitatsine movement under the leadership of Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine, an immigrant, was made up of a bunch of religious fanatics. Their modus operandi was assault and murder of both the rich and the poor, irrespective of religious learning, who in their

reckoning were not conducting themselves according to the dictates of the Quran. This half-hearted implementation of Sharia laws, especially the double standard or duplicity involved, in the Northern states of Sokoto, Kano and Borno elicited the anger of the Maitatsine group which proceeded to spearhead religious uprisings in Kano twice during 1980, which later spread to Yola and Maiduguri, north eastern Nigeria, in 1982 and 1983 respectively (Ajayi 2012).

The current Boko Haram (BH) uprising is not the first attempt to impose a religious formula in Nigeria. Islamic radicalism (of which Boko Haram represents its most militant, but by no means unique form) emerges from a long tradition of intense religious fervor that has characterized the northern region of Nigeria in particular. Islamic radicalism can be said to have manifested directly or indirectly over the past 30 years. What has changed is that religious dissent is based in cities and not, as before, in the countryside. Nigeria has recorded a series of conflicts ranging from ethnic, political, social and religious. Prominent among these crises is the recurrent nature of religious conflicts, primarily between Christians and Muslims in the northern part of the country (Walker 2008). The increased radicalization of many Muslims in the northern part of the country is responsible for various forms of violent extremism raging from religious violence and boundary disputes in the middle belt states of Plateau, Benue, Kwara, and Kogi State to the Nigerian Civil War between 1967 to 1970. Despite the degree of destruction of lives and properties that characterized these crises, none can be compared to the carnage meted on the Nigerian citizens by the terrorist group, Boko Haram.

Boko Haram, is an Islamic extremist organization that has a strong base in the north eastern region of Nigeria, with a mission to impose Sharia Law in Nigeria. The

official name of the Boko Haram group is actually Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People of the Sunnah (the practice and examples of the Prophet Muhammad's life) for Preaching and Jihad Group." However, the Hausa-speaking residents in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, where the group had its headquarters, dubbed it Boko Haram (BBC News 2014).

In Hausa language "Boko" means book (especially Western or foreign) while "Haram" is an Arabic word meaning "forbidden," "ungodly" or "sinful." Pieced together, "Boko Haram" literally means book is sinful or western education (civilization) is sinful (Danjibo 2009). However, fundamentally, the significance is that western education and civilization is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should be forbidden. Thus Boko Haram stands for outright rejection of western education, western culture and modern science. It advocates the propagation of strict adherence to Islam in its purest form. Boko Haram represents the vision and mission of a fundamentalist Islamic movement in Nigeria. The sect seeks to Islamize Nigeria by whatever means at its disposal and at whatever human cost, a similar vision to the Maitatsine Uprisings in the early 1980s (Ajayi 2012).

It can be said that Boko Haram had its roots in and drew inspiration from the Maitatsine uprisings of the early 1980s, in terms of objectives, but its organizational planning, armed resistance and modus operandi are different from the former, more in tune with the Taliban. The actual date when the extremist sect evolved is still a subject of controversy. The years: 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003 have been freely ascribed to it at different times. However, a group known as Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization evolved in 1995, was said to have progressively metamorphosed to become Boko Haram by year 2000 (Danyibo 2009).

Before 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the government. Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state. But clashes between Christians and Muslims, and harsh government treatment, including pervasive police brutality, encouraged the group to radicalize. BH's hundreds of followers, also called *Yusuffiya*, consist largely of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics, as well as professionals, many of whom are unemployed. Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, who was extra-judicially executed in 2009 while in police detention, was said to have successfully radicalized the group and opened it to foreign collaboration. Under him the group stepped up its activism and intensified the propagation of an extreme Islamic doctrine, which sees western education and democracy as corruptive and immoral (CFR 2015). So far, the destructive activities of this sect have been confined to the Northern states and the Federal Capital Territory, but there are indications that the scope may widen with time and more logistic support. The activities and effects of BH activities will be discussed in details in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Militancy and the Emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

Militant groups, which are primarily composed of young men dissatisfied at their inability to find jobs, proliferated beginning in the 1990s. The first Delta insurgent group to receive international attention was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the group launched a nonviolent campaign in 1990 against the NG and Royal Dutch-Shell to protest environmental degradation and the area's economic neglect. The group's efforts led Shell to cease production in Ogoni-land

in 1993. Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members, the "Ogoni Nine," were executed by the military regime in 1995 (Hanson 2007).

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) launched itself into the international stage in January 2006 by claiming responsibility for the capture of four foreign oil workers. Since then, the group's attacks on oil pipelines and kidnappings have reduced oil output in the Niger Delta by roughly one-third. The militants like the Niger Delta's population at large, object to the environmental degradation and underdevelopment of the region and the lack of benefits the community has received from its extensive oil resources. While there is a revenue-sharing plan in which the NG distributes roughly half of the country's oil revenues among state governors, these funds barely trickle down to the roughly 30 million residents of the Niger Delta region. In 2003, some 70 percent of oil revenues were stolen or wasted. Whereas many residents used to work as fishermen, oil installations and spills have decimated the fish population. Their attacks are designed to extort short-term funds or municipal development projects from multinational oil companies. They are well sophisticated and increasingly share a common goal of resource control, a share of the oil revenues that their region produces (Hanson 2007).

Ills of Contemporary Nigerian Socio-Political System

Before the emergence of democracy in Nigeria, that is, after the attainment of independence, it was more or less autocratic, what can be often described as benevolent despotism that existed. Military governments, beginning in 1966, took charge of the political affairs of the country with the claim that they took over to set things right. There were coups and counter coups in this regard. The constitution was often suspended, the

press was not free fundamental human rights were not respected, there was no popular participation and above all, the wishes of the masses did not count. The military was completely in charge of the affairs of the country. Any act of protest or resistance was seen as an act of treason-an offence punishable by death (Edogiawerie 2013). It is no doubt that this factor contributed to a large extent in shaping Nigeria's socio-political structure.

Nigeria's socio-political system is a dynamic one that is influenced by ethnicity, religion and politics. It can be argued that these factors are responsible for most of the problems the nation is currently facing. Literally, political "godfatherism," or what is popularly called the "Oga" factor (Oga is a Yoruba word for master), has characterized the Nigerian formal and informal systems or socio-political structure. The Oga system, a parallel traditional socio-political structure, has existed in many parts of Nigeria for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans. This is a cultural aspect of governance in traditional societies, which writers wanting to superimpose a model of democracy on developing nations tend to either ignore or not be cognizant of.

The Oga factor (this factor will be discussed in chapter 2) has seriously contributed to some challenges that the nation faces today; issues like corruption, poverty, illiteracy, weak government institutions and structures, as well as insecurity. All of these are all linked to the complex socio-political system in Nigeria. Conclusively, it can be said that socio-political stability occurs when there is relative peace, decorum and tolerance between the traditional socio-political structures and the modern western style of governance.

Thesis Question

The socio-political challenges facing Nigeria are a cause for concern, especially with groups like BH and MEND using these factors as a basis for their emergence and existence. Unfortunately, since 2009, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of terrorism being perpetrated by BH. The sect is growing in strength daily, hence the importance of this research. This thesis tends to examine the growth and activities of BH sect in Nigeria, and the level of effectiveness of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT/COIN) strategy currently used by the Nigerian Government (NG) to defeat the BH. Although the NG has recorded a significant level of success against BH, this thesis tends to point out the need to revisit and implement an approach that will make NG's CT/COIN strategy more effective.

To achieve this feat, this research will answer the primary question: What socio-political transformation strategies does the NG need to implement in order to defeat Boko-Haram and make its CT/COIN strategy more effective? In answering this primary question, the thesis will address the following secondary questions with a view to suggesting how best the NG can effectively resolve the Boko Haram crisis.

1. How was Nigeria's socio-political climate before the rise of BH and MEND insurgencies?
2. What factors are responsible for the emergence of BH in the northeastern region of Nigeria?
3. What are the possible roots causes of terrorism in Nigeria?
4. How has the activities of BH and MEND affected the nation?
5. What measures did the NG put in place to curb BH activities?

6. Is the present approach by the NG addressing the symptoms or the root causes of terrorism?
7. What changes must be made to the strategy in order to make it more effective?

Assumptions

This thesis is based on the following assumptions. That:

1. Nigeria's sovereignty and instruments of national power will continue to be the target of Boko-Haram Terrorists (BHT).
2. Only a minority of the Muslim population is radicalized in Nigeria, and that of these, only a few are involved in the Boko Haram's activities.
3. Nigeria's fight against Terrorism will continue to be supported by sub-regional, regional and international bodies.

Definition of Key Terms, Ideas, and Abbreviations

Al-Qaeda: Translated "The Base," is a global militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and several other militants, at some point between August 1988 and late 1989, that operates as a network comprising both a multinational, stateless army and an Islamist, extremist, wahhabi, jihadist group (BBC News 2004).

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): An Islamist militant organization which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).

Boko Haram (Terrorist Group): The official name of the Boko Haram group, in Hausa language Boko means book (especially Western or foreign) while Haram is an

Arabic word meaning forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Pieced together, Boko Haram literally means book is sinful or western education (civilization) is sinful, sacrilegious, or ungodly (Danjibo 2009).

Caliph: A spiritual leader of Islam, claiming succession from Muhammad (Dictionary.com 2015).

Caliphate: The rank, jurisdiction, or government of a caliph (Dictionary.com 2015).

Criminal Terrorism: Criminal Terrorism is the systematic use of acts of terror for objective of private material gains. This type of terrorism is often carried out by an individual or group of individuals mainly for selfish gains and not for the interest of any legitimate organization (Nwolise 2005).

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—The Islamic State (IS): A jihadist rebel group that controls territory in Iraq and Syria and also operates in eastern Libya, the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and other areas of the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (Roggio 2014).

Jihad: A holy war undertaken as a sacred duty by Muslims, or any vigorous, emotional crusade for an idea or principle (Dictionary.com 2015).

Maitatsine Group: A radical Islamic extremist group that was led by Mohammed Marwa in the early 1980s against the Nigerian Government by attacking police stations and innocent citizens. Maitatsine is a Hausa word meaning “the one who damns” and refers to his curse-laden public speeches against the Nigerian state (Adesoji 2011).

Political Terrorism: Political terrorism is the sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement, or faction, or by a small group of individuals. It is aimed toward the achievement of political objectives and can be carried out by either a government (those in power), the opposition (those aspiring to be in power), a liberation movement or terrorist body (Nwolise 2005).

Repressive Terrorism: Repressive Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing, quelling, or restraining certain groups, individuals, or forms of behavior considered undesirable by the repressor. The repressor may be the State or a faction, while the repression may be directed against the entire population or a selected part of it. State terror, police terror, colonial terror, and military terror fall under repressive terrorism (Nwolise 2005.

Revolutionary Terrorism: Revolutionary Terrorism is the resort to systematic tactics of violence with the aim of bringing about political revolution. National liberation movements, guerrilla groups, international terror groups often carry out revolutionary terrorism. The features of revolutionary terrorism include collective rather than individual actions; the existence of a guiding ideology or program, some degree of popular support, etc (Nwolise 2005).

Sub-Revolutionary: Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism is terrorism used for political motives other than the pursuit of revolutions. Examples are attempts to force a government to introduce a desired policy, law, or programme, revenge on government for repressive acts, or retaliation against invasion of land or cultural interference etc (Nwolise 2005).

Terrorism: Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorists' victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target, turning it into a targeting of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

Limitation

Many books, articles and journals have been written by scholars on terrorism and counterterrorism. However, specific books on the activities of BHT are recorded in articles, journals and newspapers, both local and international. As a result, this research will rely on some documents and data from the above listed sources. This research will also rely on facts from the Nigerian Army Headquarters as regards to the military phase of CT/COIN operations. Additionally, the research will focus only on the BH activities in northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. An interview with former BH members, residents of the affected areas, and freed captors of the group, would have added more credibility to the sources of this research. However, because of time constraints, this aspect was not considered. Enough data might not be available, hence; this research will be limited to the already mentioned sources.

Delimitations

This study will not cover in detail the ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. It will address them as references in the discussion of the activities of BH. The study will also analyze the underlying causes that have contributed to the radicalization and growth of BH. Among the causes to be investigated are a continuous restriction of the operating space through military operations and a decline in education, socio-political, and economic conditions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been much research on terrorism, extremist ideologies and the relationship between Islamic extremism and terrorism. This research has produced not just articles and books, but a global debate on the very definition of terrorism itself. This chapter will review and discuss relevant available literature that addresses the primary research question and the secondary questions. It will focus on the definition of terrorism, types of terrorism, causes and drivers of terrorism, and conflict theory of terrorism.

Furthermore, this chapter focuses on measures taken so far by the Nigerian Government (NG) and its allies in combating the terrorist group. The conceptual analysis lays a proper foundation for a better understanding and appreciation of the subject. This chapter further reviews existing literature in the field of terrorism, and establishes the theoretical framework of analysis for this thesis. Finally, this review will cover the position of different scholars on how best to deal with terrorist-related conflicts similar to the Boko Haram crisis.

The definition and understanding of terrorism is significant, before delving into the details of Boko Haram's activities and its effects on the nation. Terrorism is a value-laden concept that is difficult to capture in a single definition. Preferably, working on descriptions primarily before embracing a working definition will help in understanding the concept. Terrorism is from the word "terror" which conjures the image of fear and trepidation. It is an act intended to instill fear and submission in the targeted victim(s). It is usually unprovoked, random and unpredictable while its commonest form is bombing. It could also take the form of hijacking of commercial aircraft, kidnapping, assassination,

gun attack, arson and frontal assaults on important state institutions. The essential purpose being the desire to draw attention to, and-or gain sympathy for, a cause. The perpetrators are usually religious fundamentalists, extremists of the right and left, governments and underground organizations (Ajayi 2012).

Terrorism is a form of extremist Islamic activities carried out by Jihadists in the name of propagating Islam and the original tenets of the religion. One ideology that plays a key role in Islamic extremism is the principle of jihad. Terrorists use this as a means to an end, which is to establish an Islamic Caliphate and impose Sharia Law. Today, there is virtually no continent in the world that has not felt the negative impact of terrorism, either directly or indirectly. Terrorist activities and extremist ideologies are on the rise in the world today. Africa has had its own share of terrorism: The West Gate Shopping Mall attack in Kenya by an Al-Shabaab terrorist group on September 21, 2013, and the Alqaeda in the Islamic Magreeb (AQIM) as well as other splinter groups that terrorized Mali and Algeria, just to name a few.

The terrorist organization, Boko Haram, believes that politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims and infidels (non Muslims). Boko Haram believes that waging a holy war (Jihad) against the infidels is a righteous act, approved and rewarded by God. The group intends to wage a war against the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, and specifically anything-anyone that has something to do with western education, in order to create a pure Islamic state ruled by Sharia Law (Walker 2012). The fact that most of the northern states in Nigeria have been ruled by Sharia Law, as allowed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, gives jihadists much room to grow. Given the global jihadist movement, there is the likelihood

that the group may be receiving ideological, motivational, and material support from other jihadist movements in Africa and the Middle East. A number of military joint tasks forces (JTFs) were established across the country to help mitigate the violence and bring about peace. A few proactive measures were taken to defeat this group, but these measures achieved only limited results and thus indicated the lack of an effective strategy to deal with the crisis (Mantzikos 2013).

The result of extremist activities has been increased insecurity in the country, which has further weakened Nigeria's cohesion and sense of national pride. The number of homegrown terrorists is alarming, driven to violence by poverty, illiteracy, and inequality in resource distribution. Radical clerics take advantage of their predicaments to indoctrinate them into creating an Islamic state that will address all their social and economic needs. The activities of these groups bring to light the precarious religious fault lines existing in Nigeria made worse by the direct attacks on churches and Christian communities, who are minorities in the north, by the Boko Haram group. There is a resultant increase in population migration, especially in northeastern Nigeria where the Boko Haram adherents are more active. Insecurity in the region has affected the economy of the region, hence, making it almost a pariah region in this oil-rich country of Nigeria.

Terror

The term, terror, signifies a psychic state of great fear or dread. It denotes the action or quality of causing dread, and great fear. By inference, it means the action or quality of causing dread, and great fear. The act of terror therefore, can make the victim do certain things he may not have normally done (Wilkinson 1974). According to Nwolise, there are three key types of terror, which include psychic, criminal, and political

terror. Psychic terror takes the form of direct confrontation. An example could be like a terrorist pointing a gun directly on a person's forehead. Criminal terror, on the other hand, is carried out by individuals for selfish reason. For instance, when terrorists use blackmail or intimidation to enrich themselves. Political terror is the type that carries out activities in order to produce psychological terror that affects the political situation (Nwolise 2004).

Nwolise also argues that terror can be further classified into defensive, repressive, enforcement, or agitational terror. Defensive terror is the systematic use of terrorism by groups in a population to defend their traditional rights. Repressive terror is the systematic use of terrorization by a government or by rebels to eliminate their rivals, coerce popular support or maintain conformity within the rebel organisation. Enforcement terror relates to repressive terror as the former is the type launched by those in power and agitational terror stands for the terroristic acts launched by people that are seeking for power (Nwolise 2004).

The concept of terror can therefore be understood as being distinct from terrorism. The fact that without terror, there would be no terrorism does not necessarily mean that terror is terrorism. Terror may be employed by criminals for personal or selfish ends while terrorism could be described to be the use of terror as a weapon of psychological warfare for political ends, hence, the need to further explain the concept of terrorism for the purpose of clarity.

Terrorism

Just like most social science concepts, terrorism does not have a universally accepted definition. The different acts of terror or terrorism are viewed and analyzed

from different people based on different factors. For instance, while some group of people view an act of terror as evil, a few may consider it as an act of heroism. In Nigeria for instance, while the NG labeled the Niger Delta militant groups as terrorist groups, most of the locals in the region saw them as freedom fighters. Due to the complexity of the concept and frequently irrational individual responses to it, terrorism is very difficult to accurately define and to scientifically study.

A definition of terrorism states that it is the method or theory whereby an organized group seeks to achieve its vowed aims, chiefly through the use of violence. This conception of terrorism is that it is the threat or use of violence and terror for the achievement of a political, socio-economic or other expedient purpose against an individual or group of individuals, a thing or group of things, a state or group of states (Nwolise 2004). The United States Department of States also recognizes that no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. However, the Department defines terrorism as contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d); as a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (Department of State 2013). A recurrent characteristic in all these definitions is that they all have the use of threats and violence as a means of achieving terrorism.

Alex P. Schmid, in his definition on terrorism states that terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a target

population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorists' victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target, turning it into a targeting of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman 1988). This thesis will be confined to Schmid's definition of terrorism.

Types of Terrorism

Despite the different definitions of terrorism, there are some elements that are evident in the numerous definitions. There are different types of terrorism based on different variables or factors of classification. These are: political, criminal, repressive, state, revolutionary, and sub-revolutionary terrorisms (Nwolise 2004). The definition (key terms) sub-heading in chapter 1 can be referred to for the meaning of the different types of terrorism.

Theories and Causes of Terrorism

An understanding of the motivation behind extremism, and the causes of terrorism will help toward understanding the reasons why terrorism emerges, and how terrorists operate. In turn, this understanding will assist to form an effective and comprehensive counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to defeat Boko Haram (BH) terrorism. The root causes of terrorism are diverse in nature and vary depending on geographical locations and socio-political concepts. Hence, the need for a detailed analysis of the foundation and drivers of terrorism, as well as other factors, all in a view to providing a robust socio-political approach in Nigeria's CT/COIN strategy in order to make it more effective.

The Foundation and Drivers of Terrorism

Researchers into the concept of terrorism believe that there are peculiar factors that can be attributed to the emergence of terrorist activities within any society. In supporting this assertion, Huma Haider stressed the criticality of socio-economic factors as a potential driver of religious extremism. She observed that people's socio-economic situations, ranging from unemployment to lack good education, lack of social services and essentials of life, could possibly drive one to resort to extremism. She also indicated that even though the socio-economic factors are important in explaining terrorism and insurgency, there is no empirical evidence to support the arguments that the reduction of poverty and rapid change in economic growth alone could eradicate terrorism once it forms. She however claimed that most violence of a non-political nature could be attributed to economic inequalities (Haider 2007).

In addition, Haider points out that a nation's weak political structure is a possible driver of terrorism. The absence of a strong, people-oriented political reform, lack of politics of inclusion and proper representation could lead to possible grievances, which could increase terrorist activities by the aggrieved parties. Weak democratic governance structure could also be responsible for the emergence and evolution of domestic terrorist groups. In defense of this factor, some proponents compared and argued that consolidated, mature democracies and totalitarian states are less likely to experience domestic terrorism than semi-authoritarian states because of the policies and structure in place (Haida 2007).

Socio-economic inequalities could also cause dissatisfaction, which in turn can be a conflict driver and a breeding environment for extremism and terrorism. Economic

inequalities, coupled with political grievances, like ethnic and religious discrimination, is a possible root cause of conflict in Nigeria. Many studies of terrorism reveal a significant correlation between terrorism and socio-economic inequalities. There is also evidence that many countries experiencing economic growth seem to tolerate increased inequality without greater exposure to violent conflict. Research findings support a relationship between the average per capita income across countries and civil conflict (Haider 2007).

Personalities play a fundamental role as drivers of terrorism in many cases, such as Osama Bin Laden. The individual's belief system, ideology or personality profile could be deepened by a negative social situation or grievance, which could prompt the emergence of terrorism. In such cases however, a search for social context-based determinants of terrorism that includes the consideration of socio-economic status, age, education, relative deprivation, religion, foreign occupation, or poverty has suffered from two fundamental problems. Conceptually, while many people share the same oppressive environments, only a few ever consider joining terrorist organizations. Empirically, none of the environmental factors may automatically produce terrorism or constitute the necessary and sufficient cause of terrorism. The drivers in many cases, aside from the personal causes and ideological reasons, remain the motivating factor which could be rooted in the belief in the sense of social duty and obligation whether internalized or induced by social pressure to commit terrorist acts (Kruglanski and Fishman 2009).

Symptoms of Terrorism

Many scholars vary in their views on an effective way in tackling terrorist-related conflicts in national and trans-national spheres. While some are of the opinion that the main efforts in combating terrorism should be on attacking the symptoms of the crisis

over the long term in an attempt to starve out the crisis, others claim that a focus on resolving the root causes is the most effective way to curb terrorism. In relation to attacking the symptoms, Paul Bremer states that the west's strategy of counterterrorism is based on a sustained period of operations aimed at making the political, economic, and psychological climate in which terrorists operate more hostile, which will eventually bring terrorism down to a level at which it can be controlled by law enforcement agencies (Bremer 1987).

Thomas Dempsey, a supporter of this position, identified the U.S. government's predominant approach is of direct military actions targeted against identified terrorist cells with a view to starving out terrorism without necessarily tackling the root causes (Dempsey 2006). His position seems to be more related to transnational or international terrorism. In his view, Oldrich Bures states that the European counterterrorism policy, having considered the root causes of terrorism as politically incorrect, focuses more on attacking the symptoms to starve out terrorism and stop radicalization (Bures 2011).

Another proponent, Dennis Sandole, stressed that there is a tendency to locate terrorism and respond to it in a method similar to the Israeli approach of targeted assassinations and destruction of assets associated with individuals involved in terrorism. These methods are used in an attempt to starve out terrorism and eliminate the incentives for any aspiring terrorist. It also looks at attacking key leaders, who are centers of gravity for their cells, thereby weakening the command structure (Sandole 2004).

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, postulated that targeting terrorists and those who support terrorists activities, as well as their sympathizers who by actions indirectly support terrorism, should be considered criminal actions aimed at diverting the

attention of the public (Netanyahu 1986). This approach is further supported by the Global Non-Profit Information Networks, which identifies the current counterterrorism policies as encouraging charities to avoid conflict hotspots and collaboration with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in attacking the root-causes of terrorism (Global Non-Profit Information Networks 2015). All these approaches target the symptoms of terrorism and completely ignore the root causes.

Root Causes of Terrorism

When it comes to identifying the root cause of terrorism, many are compelled to point fingers at poverty and lack of education. The argument, in a nutshell, goes as follows: Poor, uneducated people are easily lured with promises of heaven and can be convinced to blow up other people in order to attain it. However, the idea does not stand its ground when confronted with facts. Marc Sageman compiled background data of about 400 Al Qaeda members and discovered that three-quarters belonged to the middle or upper class. He further noted that the vast majority—90 percent—came from caring, intact families. Sixty-three percent had gone to college, as compared with the 5 to 6 percent that is usual for the third world. These are the best and brightest of their societies in many ways (Jakarta Globe 2009).

Economists Efraim Benmelech, of Harvard University, and Claude Berrebi, of the RAND Corporation, also came to the same conclusion when they gathered data on Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel from 2000 to 2005. They discovered that education is very much valued in the "terrorism market." Better educated individuals are more likely to be successful in carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks and have lower chances of getting caught. The alleged leader of the 9/11 attacks, Mohammed Atta, had a graduate

degree, while both Azahari and Noordin M. Top, the masterminds of most of the major terrorist attacks over the last decade in Indonesia, were skilled engineers and scientists. None of them were poor; all three came from affluent families (Jakarta Globe 2009).

Many terrorist masterminds come from countries with repressive governments, like the Arab states and, arguably some African nations. Repressive governments tend to bar legal avenues for voicing dissent, thus making extreme demonstrations of opposition more attractive. When the cost of legal dissent increases, due to threat of legal repercussions, the relative cost of illegal dissent is lowered. Hence terrorism becomes a viable venue (Jakarta Globe 2009).

Another fact is that acts of terrorism, such as suicide bombings, require the fear of the pain involved in the act and the reservation of hurting other people to be overcome. The most effective way of doing this is by psychological enforcement, most notably through an authority or peers. A common trait shared by terrorists is that they have an authority figure that they fully and unquestionably respect. It's also very common for prospective terrorists to join a perverse cause through preexisting social bonds with people who are already terrorists or have decided to join (Jakarta Globe 2009).

In a contrast of thoughts on the root causes of terrorism, a contending approach argues that addressing symptoms is not effective in eradicating terrorism. Scholars of this view argue that instead, policies and efforts should address the root causes that drive individuals to join terrorist groups or be self-radicalized. A proponent, Joshua Sinai, asserts that terrorists are generally driven to commit acts of terrorism due to rational or irrational factors, in an attempt to express grievances and voice out their demands. Sinai said that the inter-relationship of these factors, which could include lack of quality

education, economic deprivation, and political marginalization, are the root causes of violence. He added that an attempt to resolve the conflict without solving these root causes would only address terrorism temporarily (Sinai 2008). This posits one of the ineffective strategies used by the Nigerian government. It can therefore be said that this strategy only addresses the symptoms and not the root causes that gave rise to the Boko Haram crises in Nigeria.

Daniel Byman, a scholar of root causes of terrorism, stated that a solution focused on addressing the root causes is best for resolving terrorist-related conflicts. He pointed out that the use of only military force, as a means of tackling terrorism, is considered weak and brutal. Such an approach creates an action-reaction cycle of violence, which perpetuates a terrorist group and bolsters its ranks through new recruits inspired by their capabilities (Byman 2007). Another scholar, Thomas Riegler, argued that terrorism can only be tackled if the root causes are addressed. He identified some root causes as political, social, and economic (Riegler 2011). These identified root causes can be directly related to the rise of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

In the case of Yonah Alexander, he identified that what was missing in the counterterrorism strategy in Egypt was a long-term effort to address the root causes of terrorism (Alexander 2006). Anne Aldis and Graeme Hard similarly asserted that counterterrorism efforts must address the root causes of global Muslim grievances. Terrorism cannot be stopped simply through the defeat of the terrorist forces or by attacking the underlying values of the acts, obsession with revenge, and the ideological motivations but by addressing the root causes (Aldis and Herd 2006). Other literature focuses on the use of force as a reaction to terrorist acts. Thomas Imobighe argues against

this response by stating that the ideals behind most counterterrorism measures on the utilization of the state's coercive apparatus to crackdown on the perpetrators of terrorism is not a functional approach because it fails to address the root causes of terrorism and also exposes the weakness of such counterterrorism efforts (Imobighe 2006).

Limiting of the operating space of the terrorists through the use of military force alone is another typical strategy adopted by the Nigerian Government, which is considered an attempt at tackling the symptoms. Daniel Masters posits that such an approach will achieve limited results because it has not reduced terrorism globally. He stressed that despite this counterterrorism approach, many terrorist organizations still continue to thrive daily, launching attacks with increasing lethality all over the world (Masters 2009). This is true with the Boko Haram group, which has continued to launch attacks in the northeastern region of Nigeria, despite the measures put in place through the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which does not effectively address the root causes (Nigerian Government 2011).

John Nagl stated that the use of military force alone can not effectively stop terrorism because the war on terrorism is asymmetric in nature and remains driven by many factors. He believes a comprehensive review must be considered to tackle the many complementary factors driving the terrorists as well as to prevent further radicalization. He said that in order to be successful, military doctrine must consider gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the insurgents. Nagl added that not only is it important not to apply excessive force, even when justified, but counterinsurgency (COIN) operations must also consider issues and actions from the perspective of the domestic population (Nagl 2002).

The causes of terrorism are ones that have been under serious debate. While there is no universal acceptance on the causes of terrorism established, it is important to note that it is a combination of several causes that leads to terrorism. Some of these causes are ethno-nationalism, alienation—discrimination, religion, socio-economic status, and political grievances.

Political Godfatherism—Oga Factor

Nigeria is a democratic nation, which means it is a government by the people. By this, it implies that the government in power is licensed by the collective consent of the larger majority of the masses or commoners. Put differently, it is not a government by a few individuals or the minority but a government by a large majority of people in the political environment. Being a government for the people also means that the policies of the government serve the best interest of the larger majority or common masses. The interest of the common man, here, is in terms of the equitable distribution and allocation of resources. Its respect for fundamental human rights is such that is not obtainable in any other form of government (Edogiawerie 2013).

The wielding of power by oligarchs, “big men,” “Ogas,” or “king makers” is a West African tradition, and elsewhere, it has not necessarily been associated with corruption. But, the Nigerian style of Oga domination, fueled by corruption, emerged from the confluence of the militarization of governance during the long period of military regimes before and after the Nigerian civil war in 1967 to 1970. Since then, elite maneuvering and bargaining have become nonstop to access ever-greater amounts of power based on the nation’s oil wealth. The growing impoverishment of most Nigerians paradoxically strengthens the system because it has cemented the people’s reliance on

patronage networks for survival. The coteries of patron-client networks are interconnected of every level of society and government (Campbell 2011).

The domination of power by the hegemonic class in many parts of the contemporary world can be said to be nothing new but has a robust pedigree. The main idea is that the study of political elites and leadership is very important for understanding the trajectories of development and stability in any society. The Oga system of patron-client relationship, while traditional, is still very much at play in Nigeria and it reinforces the control of power in the hands of an elite few. A variety of conflicts are produced as a result of the failure to address this issue (Albert 2005). This factor is responsible for a weak government structure or institution, which in turn, breeds a mindset of alienation or discrimination among a group of people in a society.

Alienation—Discrimination

In most parts of the world today, a high number of immigrants are discriminated against based on factors like race, religion or skin colour. This sense or feeling of alienation by immigrants could be a driver of terrorism (Grothaus 2015). There's always a clash of cultures between the immigrants and the host nation's system. This most times becomes frustrating and may result in a feeling of exclusion from the society in which they live. Growing sentiments of discrimination can lead groups to look to more conservative, and eventually, extremist ideologies (Grothaus 2015). The Hamburg Cell, consisting of two of the pilots in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, serves as a perfect example. The cell included a number of expatriate Muslims studying in Germany who sought out other conservative Muslims to band together when they felt homesick in a Western society that was alien to them (Grothaus 2015).

Ethno-nationalism

The zeal to be independent could be reasons for a group of people's break away from a government or ruling power in order to form a state of their own, hence the formation of terrorist groups. This is the kind of desire that characterized the 20th century world where many regions try to gain independence from their colonial masters. (Grothaus 2015). This factor could also be said to be the reason for an attempted cessation by the Eastern region of Nigeria, which eventually led to the Nigeria Civil war from 1967 to 1970.

Religion

Religion is a major factor exploited by extremist terrorists groups. It can be said to be one of the major contributors of terrorism in recent times. This factor gives terrorist or extremist groups a form of legitimacy and authority. The drive by extremist religious (Islamic) groups to establish or re-establish an Islamic Caliphate, within and outside their geographical domain, is driving the desires of many hard-core believers into terrorism. There are an increasing number of Muslim faithful who believe that an international Islamic Caliphate must be re-established, and that all of the people within in must be ruled by Sharia Law.

Tackling the Root Causes and Symptoms of Terrorism Simultaneously

For an effective counterterrorism strategy to be achieved, the origins and drivers of the conflict must be identified and addressed in order to resolve the crisis. Mark Sedgwick makes a strong argument by stating that the cause of every terrorist group must be understood as well as their history before an effective counterterrorism policy can be

adopted. Despite the criticisms of using military force in COIN activities, most scholars strongly believe that the use of the military is necessary and effective in some aspects of COIN. Military force is necessary for de-escalation and containment before other relevant and necessary policies can be effectively applied to address the issues driving the conflict (Sedgwick 2007).

Martha Crenshaw pointed out that the initial grievances which drive terrorist activities may often change after the initiation of the action-reaction cycle. New drivers may emerge to motivate terrorist groups. Even though the group's reasons for resorting to terrorism may have been relevant, new drivers may emerge that will negate all state responses, even when the original grievances are addressed, in which case a physical crushing of the group may be necessary (Crenshaw 1981). Denis Sandole proposed a two-prong solution that points to actors who deal with the symptoms of terrorism, the conflicted relationships and their underlying causes as well as the conditions that have given rise to the symptoms (Sandole 2004).

Another scholar, Istifanus Zabadi, also supports a two-prong solution as a means of crisis resolution. He posits that a crackdown on terrorism and terrorists creates draconian measures that include indiscriminate arrest and detention of suspects as well as harassment of political opponents, which could lead to support for the terrorists. This act may also lead to the dispersion of the terrorists and will create new rounds of violent activities in other areas of the country. In addition, many of the dispersed move to new areas where they set up cells that have successfully carried out attacks with devastating consequences. Zabadi therefore affirms that the exclusive use of force aids the militants in their efforts to radicalize and mobilize the general population, thereby strengthening

their warped vision of the world. He suggests that the symptoms and root causes of a crisis must be simultaneously tackled (Zabadi 2006).

The literature reviewed for this thesis highlights different views of scholars on how best to address terrorism in Nigeria. Some of the scholars believe that targeting the symptoms alone is capable of destroying terrorists, dissipating their infrastructure, and limiting their support base which would be enough to eventually starve out all incentives for "would be terrorists," thus bringing the crisis to an end. These arguments, however, point out its effectiveness in situations of the strategic targeting of terrorists across international borders, similar to the U.S. in Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as well as the Israelis in Palestine. Such arguments may not be effective in the case of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

In contrast, some scholars maintain that addressing the root causes is the most appropriate strategy for counterterrorism in Nigeria. They argue that root causes are mostly economic, political, and social, and that once inequalities in these aspects are addressed, terrorism will dwindle and eventually become unpopular. Despite their positions, scholars of this thought failed to take into account the fact that other drivers often emerge during conflicts, which could be separate from the root causes at inception. The additional factors may eventually metamorphose into fundamental grievances in the crisis, creating a critical vulnerability. These new drivers make things difficult to resolve crises, even if or after the original root causes have been addressed.

This thesis will use the existing literature as a basis for research and will fill in the gap in the literature for how governments react to terrorism. Most of this literature will form a critical part of this thesis aimed at suggesting a framework that will not only

address the symptoms of but also the root causes of the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria. This framework will assess three arguments on how best to combat Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. The first is that a military approach is justified in resolving the Boko Haram crisis and that it remains an integral part of any solution. Therefore, for an effective strategy, the government must provide sufficient resources to sustain and strengthen the Nigerian Armed Forces. This military approach is to include regional military cooperation in order to limit the operating space of the BH terrorists. The second argument is that any effective solution would only be achievable by tackling the root causes of the conflict. Therefore, the Nigerian government must focus on addressing all the identified root causes of the crisis. The third argues for a solution that targets both the symptoms and the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

Effects of Terrorism on the Society

There is no doubt that the effects of terrorism on the society largely depend on the source, objectives, and the extent of force applied by a particular terrorist group. This notwithstanding, the consequences of terrorism include, but are not limited to death, physical injury and pain, emotional stress, kidnapping, human rights abuse, destruction of property and infrastructure, fear, mental agony, and economy disruption. These have been the problems suffered by many countries, including Nigeria, that are affected by one terrorist group or the other (Ani 2014).

Counterterrorism Theory

The strategy of combating terrorism can be attributed to the effect of the menace of terrorism on the society. Consequently, counterterrorism theory was established as a

guide to combating terrorism. The campaign framework for counterterrorism is composed of three elements: friendly, enemy, and the global environment. The structure of the campaign uses five logical Lines of Effort (LOEs). These LOEs are further divided into two categories consisting of direct and indirect approaches (Joint Chief of Staff 2009). The direct approach is the effort applied directly against the enemy while the indirect approach is applied indirectly to influence the global or operational environment (Joint Chief of Staff 2009). The aim of the framework is to create a stabilized environment, which is hostile to terrorists and their organizations, and to isolate, neutralize, and prevent the reemergence of the threats posed by terrorism.

Direct Approach

The direct approach in the counterterrorism framework is an action taken against terrorists and their organizations in order to neutralize an imminent threat and degrade the operational capability of a terrorist organization. The goals of this approach are to defeat a specific threat through neutralization or dismantlement of the network and to prevent the reemergence of a threat once neutralized. However, the long term effectiveness of the direct approach, if solely applied, is limited by the resiliency of terrorist organizations and their ability to reorganize. The LOEs that are specific to direct approach are to: disrupt terrorists and their organizations and to deny them access to and use of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). The first LOE focuses on the terrorists infrastructure and leadership which provide them connectivity and resources. The second LOE focuses on denying acquisition, development, or the use of WMD against sovereign states (Ani 2014).

Indirect Approach

The indirect approach to counterterrorism theory describes the means within which the operational environments can be influenced to achieve successful counterterrorism operations. The goals of an indirect approach are to enable partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations, and to shape (stabilize) the environment in order to weaken the capabilities and support lines of terrorist organizations. Activities in this approach include: Foreign Internal Defense; Unconventional Warfare; Stability Operations; Civil Military Operations; Counterintelligence; Information Operation; Psychological Operations; and Strategic Communication. The indirect approach LOEs are geared towards: enabling allies or partners to combat terrorism; to deter implied and active support for terrorism; and to wear down support for terrorist ideologies (Joint Chief of Staff 2009).

Defining the Threat to Nigeria's Unity

As previously discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, the problem of internal security currently affecting the nation today has its roots in Nigeria's history, geopolitical structure, ethno-religious composition, and slow socio-economic development. The British colonial rule and its forced merger of disparate ethnic groups to create Nigeria can be said to be a foundational cause for insecurity in Nigeria. In addition, economic inequality, structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious, regional, and political composition of Nigeria and the manipulation of such identities for political power is another reason for violence in the country. A poll conducted in 2001 showed religion (25 percent), socio-economic issues (22 percent) and ethnicity (18 percent) as the major causes of violence and insecurity in Nigeria. BH appears to be fueled by all three factors,

while political patronage, support, and funding by senior government officials who exploited it for electoral purposes contributed to BH's rapid growth and relevance (Udounwa 2013).

While BH initially limited their operations within Nigeria, its attack on the United Nations building demonstrates an apparent willingness to align itself with the goals and tactics of established global terrorist organizations. With the group increasingly becoming stronger and the number, potency, and geographical reach of its attacks increasing, its threat and attacks have since extended beyond Nigeria's borders. Not only is the group a threat to Nigeria's internal security, the whole sub-region of West Africa has, one way or the other, been affected by their attacks (especially, Cameroun, and the Republics of Chad and Niger). BH also pledge their allegiance to ISIS, and have connections to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda's North African branch, and Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic militant group that seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia (ADL 2014).

The Nigerian Government's Response

The NG's response to the BH insurgency has recorded a level of significant success. The Nigerian CT/COIN forces have achieved a great feat in degrading the influence of the group by attacking the leadership and the destructing key operational cells. However, the CT/COIN strategy has mainly been through the use of military force. The Nigerian COIN forces, and a sub-regional coalition force comprising Cameroun and the Republics of Chad and Niger, have been on the offensive since 2015.

Despite the one-sided strategy, the NG has made efforts to engage the group using a soft power approach. In August 2011, the NG engaged in talks with BH, based on

recommendations by a panel tasked to negotiate with the group and provide amnesty for those who renounce violence. On September 16, 2011, former president Olusegun Obasanjo held talks with some BH members in their birthplace and stronghold, the northeastern city of Maiduguri, where they tabled demands for a ceasefire which included an end to arrests and killings of their members, payment of compensation to families of sect members killed by security personnel, and prosecution of policemen responsible for the killing of the sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in June 2009 (IRIN News 2015).

The responses by the NG can be said to have achieved a degree of success. Even though the group's activities still persists, it is evident that a robust socio-political approach is needed in order to tackle some root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, with the aim of not only defeating BH terrorist organization, but ensuring that there is no reemergence of any group of this nature in the future.

Summary of Chapter 2 and Preview of Chapter 3

This chapter reviewed some theories and literature concerning terror, terrorism, and counterterrorism. It also discussed some of the root causes and symptoms of terrorism as well as the drivers and effects of terrorism in society. The literature review gave an insight into the threats posed by terrorists and a need to address these issues because of the devastating effects of the phenomena. This chapter also attempted to define the threat of BH as it affects not just Nigeria's internal security, but also West Africa's. The NG's response and its effects as regards this crisis were also looked at in this chapter.

In addition, based on the discussions in this chapter, it is evident that the root causes of terrorism in any society are predominantly socio-political or socio-cultural in

nature, citing societal ills, governmental weaknesses and social imbalance as the basis for the emergence of terrorist groups, such as BH. Suffice it to say that a purely military approach in CT/COIN has not being able to effectively tackle BH activities in Nigeria, hence the need for a robust socio-political approach in making Nigeria's CT strategy more effective.

Chapter 3 is a discussion of the methodology to be used by the author in emphasizing the need for an effective CT/COIN strategy in tackling BH. The chapter will also discuss variables based on three dimensions-political, economic, and socio-cultural. The variables are based on the fact that a long-term gain is needed in order to not only defeat BH group, but counter a reemergence of a similar group in the future. Subsequently, chapter 3 is also aimed at pointing the need to tackle the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, rather than addressing the symptoms, with a view to making Nigeria's CT strategy more effective, leading to the subsequent destruction of BH.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to identify socio-political ways in which the Nigeria Government (NG) can apply in order to neutralize the BH terrorist group in Nigeria. In doing this, the author provides a platform for better understanding the dynamics and composition of the threats posed by BH in comparison with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), while looking at responses by the Government of Nigeria. This is done in the hopes of providing some analysis on an effective strategy in mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by these groups. The author will conduct this study using the variables and case study methods outlined by the National Defense Research Institute (RAND) in their study *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, and its companion volume, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, both by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill.

Chapter 1 of this thesis introduced the readers to the general context of Nigeria, and specifically the history of jihadist movements, while highlighting the context of the impoverished Muslim north and the oil rich Niger Delta regions (south) of Nigeria. Chapter 1 also provided background data and formed the research questions that will guide in understanding this phenomenon in order to proffer acceptable recommendations. Some useful terms and concepts used in this study, as well as assumptions and limitations to this course of study were also outlined.

Chapter 2 reviewed the literature that explained the phenomena, counterterrorism theory, context of terror (terrorism), types of terrorism, as well as history of terrorism in Nigeria and the NG's response. It also pointed out the dichotomy between the root causes and symptoms of terrorism as explained by authors and scholars—particularly Nigerian and European. In furtherance of the points already discussed, chapter 3 outlines the research methodology used during the conduct of this research. It also explains the analytical method to be used in the study. The research uses the descriptive qualitative analytical method of research, using case studies, as a way to analyze the phenomena. The study will focus on two case studies and analyze the employment of the concept of counterterrorism used by the NG, its effectiveness and challenges. The research will base its study on the content analysis of primary and secondary data.

Qualitative Analytical Method

The methodology used for this research is the qualitative methodology using case studies. Descriptive qualitative analysis uses detailed descriptions of specific situations from interviews, observations or document reviews. Due to the research limitations, there were no interviews conducted for this study; however, observations and document reviews were used. This research made maximum use of primary and secondary resources from the Combined Arm Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Considering the years the BH group has existed, there have not been significant books published on the group as of the time of this work. However, this research utilized information from scholarly journals and electronic media, including magazines and newspapers.

The purpose of the case studies in this research is to examine possible socio-political causes of the crisis experienced by Nigeria, and the role of the NG to counter the menace with a view to comparing the approaches. The case study methodology emphasizes detailed conceptual analysis of key events or conditions and determines how they relate to each other. Case study, as a methodology, helps explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation (Zainal 2007). The qualitative research method involves an interpretive and systematic inquiry into meanings.

In an effort to counter the BH insurgency in Nigeria, this study establishes a model for an effective socio-political approach to the counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. The author, using the RAND case study methodology, compares the all military approach that has characterized the NG's approach to curb security challenges with that of a socio-political and cultural approach, which has been given little or no attention by the NG. Based on the observations by this research, the model has a very good chance of achieving the end state, which is to neutralize the BH terrorist group.

The author has decided to use a qualitative case study method analyzing Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), fashioned after the case studies the case studies in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies,* published by the National Defense Research Institute. This research method is a suitable and feasible one due to the fact that both organizations operated in a loose (decentralized) manner, as well as the timeliness of the topics. New information is constantly added to the discourse on Boko Haram and MEND. An explanation of this form of study is contained in this statement:

> In qualitative evaluation, data collection and data analysis are not temporally discrete stages; as soon as the first pieces of data are collected, the evaluator begins the process of making sense of the information. Moreover, the different processes involved in qualitative analysis also overlap in time. Part of what distinguishes qualitative analysis is the loop-like pattern of multiple rounds of revisiting the data as additional questions emerge, new connections are unearthed, and more complex formulations develop along with a deepening understanding of the material. Qualitative analysis is fundamentally an *iterative* [sic] set of processes. (Frechtling and Sharp 1997)

In the course of this research, between late 2014 and early 2015, the dynamism of the group and its activities was manifested in that there were new press reports and analytical studies almost on a daily basis as to their operation. As a result of this factor, it is pertinent to state that there is no fixed amount of data on the subject matter. Thus, as the quote above suggests, data on these timely subjects have been visited many times and analysis is, therefore, very iterative in nature. This leads to the fact that the comparative case study methodology can also be used. By comparing two groups, the scholar can see characteristics in one that may or may not appear in another and the degree to which that might be the case. This then allows for a more complete and unbiased analysis of the phenomenon.

Brief Reviews of Methodology Works

The qualitative case study analysis is a social science research methodology that is commonly used. In *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, RAND provides the scholar and readers with a wide variety of case studies of counterinsurgencies throughout the world. Each case study is evaluated against some criteria to determine if the counterinsurgency operations (COIN) were a success or failure. The authors also produced a companion a follow-on volume, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, which explains the

methodology used, as well as possible concerns with the methodology. The criteria used in this chapter will be excerpts from the RAND case study criteria and a few common indices based on the author's understanding of the culture of the affected regions and their expectations from the NG.

More general in scope to the above mentioned references, is the *Guide to Methods of Students of Political Science*, by Stephen Van Evera (Director of Graduate Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). The book provides the reader and would-be scholars with various options and guidelines on how to frame questions and hypotheses. In addition, it discusses what constitutes a case study, as well as it provides a useful review of professional ethics.

Selected Model for Analysis

In order to explain the case studies and to determine the effectiveness of the government's socio-political strategy in countering insurgencies in Nigeria, a selection of specific variables used by RAND in *Victory Has A Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* will be used, with the aim of producing two case studies, on MEND and Boko Haram, modeled on the case study analyses in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies.*

A select number of variables will be analyzed to draw conclusions on the two case studies as to the advantages and disadvantages of a purely military approach to CT/COIN, and the effectiveness of addressing some socio-political ills as a means to an overall effective COIN strategy. Some key variables that will be used for this analysis will be characterized under three sub-headings. These are; Political dimension, Economic

dimension and Socio-cultural dimension. The reader may review all the variables in table 1 in this monograph.

In the case studies, the Government, as pointed out in the variables, represents the Federal Government of Nigeria. The people are the societies or communities in the affected regions (north-east and south-south); while the COIN force(s) are the military, police and other Para-military forces, security services and other agencies that comprise the Joint Task Force (JTF), or other arm or service dispatched by the NG to curb the threats posed by Boko Haram and MEND.

Binary Analysis

Using the RAND model, each of the established variables will be ranked with a "1" for present and a "0" for absent. It is important to state that the definitive "presence" or "absence" of some of the variables used cannot be determined by this author in this study. A number of factors are responsible for it, such as limited information (both classified and unclassified), conflicting information based on some scholars' biases, or simply an inability to understand the parameters of some variables. While the author has made a good faith effort to mark each variable, these reasons, and the mere timeliness of on-going insurgencies upon which new information appears almost daily, has formed a limitation to these efforts.

While the RAND model provides a comprehensive look and explanation of methodology used, it must be noted that it did not provide further explanation on how to understand the variables. For example, detailed information is not made available to the readers as to what extent (degree or percent of increase, monetary investment, etc.) investments or improvements had to occur in order for "short-term investments,

improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in the area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force" to be considered "present." The author of this monograph, nevertheless, made those determinations for Boko Haram and MEND. Thus, it should be noted that RAND addresses this issue, and engaged in "vigorous debate over whether the factors truly represented what we intended them to capture" (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a).

The analysis of the variables as present or absent was beneficial to this research in a number of ways. First, due to the dynamic nature of the MEND and BH's operations, this method made it possible to analyze which variables existed or no longer existed. It enabled the author to determine if the NG CT/COIN strategy has addressed some socio-political problems, which forms a basis of the root causes of terrorism and insurgencies in Nigeria. For example, the existence of an amnesty program initiated by late President Umaru Yar'Adua (Nigeria), in the second phase of the MEND insurgency, but not in the first phase, made the author draw a conclusion that the NG's COIN approach was effective in one phase, but was a ineffective in the second phase.

Designation of CT/COIN Effectiveness

The RAND study inputs cannot be overlooked as it provides a foundation for this research to analyze the CT/COIN level of effectiveness. An unambiguous effective COIN strategy occurs when "the government stays in power, the country remains intact, and no major concessions were granted to the insurgents." An ineffective COIN strategy occurs when "insurgents either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of) the government or won de facto control of a separatist region (example: Somalia)." A "mixed" result occurred

when the government stays in power but "major concessions (to the insurgents) were made" (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b).

Despite the distinction, RAND clearly points out that in contemporary parlance, some form of a mixed result characterizes most cases, because rarely does one side receive everything that it seeks, without a compromise. It should be clarified that while RAND analysts have allowed for the option of mixed results for phases, it is always with either a determination that the phase favored either the COIN force or the insurgency. Final case analyses, are, however, determined to be either an effective or ineffective CT/COIN strategy by the NG.

Irrespective of the above analysis, the author tries to address the primary question as to the socio-political measures that the NG can use to make its CT/COIN strategy more effective. A more holistic view will be discussed in the case studies, looking at some overlooked factors categorized under socio-cultural, economic and political dimensions, in a bid to determining the level of effectiveness of the already existing CT/COIN strategy.

Phasing of Case Studies

To begin the analysis using the RAND construct, it is pertinent to determine the various phases of the insurgencies of Boko Haram and MEND. In its study, RAND declared a new stage in an insurgency when it recognized "a significant shift in the COIN approach, in the approach of the insurgents, or in the exogenous conditions of the case." The RAND model clearly pointed out that the phases represent changes in the macro, rather than the micro level (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a).

This research points out the following as phases in the Boko Haram and MEND insurgencies. Although there are discrepancies by many scholars as to when Boko Haram started, this study will review the insurgency since its more recent manifestation in 2003. Phase One will be called "Homegrown Insurgency." This phase will look at a beginning period during which Boko Haram is generally considered to be an exclusively homegrown insurgency. The group's activities are not well known and it is not considered as a violent one. This phase ends with the arrest and death of Boko Haram's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in the summer of 2009, after which, the group went underground.

Phase Two will be called "Increasing Violence and Internationalism" (Elkaim 2013). It will date from the reemergence of the group in March of 2010 up to early 2015. This phase will encompass its first international target, the United Nations Building in Abuja, on August 26, 2011. The attack was the second time the group used a suicide bomber, (the first being the attack on the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011). In the case of the UN building, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle packed with explosives outside the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, destroying several floors in a thunderous blast that left at least 18 people dead and many people injured. This phase will also consider the group's increasing association with the global terrorist network (New York Times 2011).

Phase Three, which is practically a new phase, will be called "A sub-set of the Islamic State (IS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)," as it is popularly called. The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) on March 7, 2015 (BBC Africa 2015b). Previously Boko Haram was a sort of outcast in

the global jihadi community. Now, with this new trend, the implication is that the group will gain legitimacy and global recognition, which will help its recruiting, funding and logistics as it expands. It also means that the group will get guidance from ISIS in media warfare and propaganda. Apparently, it appears that BH is perhaps ISIS's biggest affiliate (CNN 2015c).

The Niger Delta militancy and acts of sabotage by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or MEND, in southern region of Nigeria has existed for decades, mainly because of oil, which accounts for a large amount of Nigeria's revenue. Militant groups, which are primarily composed of young men dissatisfied at their inability to find jobs, proliferated beginning in the 1990s. The first Delta insurgent group to receive international attention was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the group launched a nonviolent campaign in 1990 against the government and Royal Dutch-Shell to protest environmental degradation and the area's economic neglect. The group's efforts led Shell to cease production in Ogoni in 1993. Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members, the "Ogoni Nine," were executed by the military regime in 1995 (Hanson 2007).

This study will only focus, however, on the manifestation of MEND since 2005, when it first declared itself using that name, and later launched itself onto the international stage in January 2006 by claiming responsibility for the capture of four foreign oil workers. Since then, the group's attacks on oil pipelines and kidnappings have reduced oil output, at times, in the Niger Delta by roughly one-third (Hanson 2007). The first phase will be called "Pre-Amnesty" and will date from late 2005 to August 5, 2009, when the President of Nigeria offered an amnesty and reconciliation package to Delta

militants. The second phase, entitled “Post-Amnesty” will date from August 6, 2009 to the present. The amnesty offered by the Government of Nigeria signified the major change in the NG’s COIN strategy.

Political Dimension

The political dimension of conflict in Nigeria is endemic. It includes issues such as electoral crises, inter-governmental relation crises over resource sharing, among others. Nigeria’s history of political or electoral crises can be traced back to the 1964 electoral crisis, which marked the watershed in the nation’s political history. The political and electoral manipulation in the old western region escalated to other parts of Nigeria and led to a national crisis, which eventually became part of the problems that culminated in the first military coup of January 15, 1966.

The coup witnessed southern Nigerian soldiers, led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, who assassinated senior Nigerian politicians and military officers, mostly from the north. The coup plotters attacked the key cities of Kaduna, Ibadan, and Lagos while also blockading the Niger and Benue Rivers within a two day span of time. The coup terminated the First Republic and later led to the Nigerian Civil war. While the First Republic collapsed as a result of factors arising from regional intra-party crisis, the second Republic also collapsed under the same circumstances (Afegbua 2014).

These historical facts have been recurrent and the NG seems to be paying little attention to the lessons learned as a way of mitigating its escalation in present day Nigeria. Conflict seems insurmountable in Nigeria because Nigeria is preoccupied with addressing symptoms and not the fundamental causes of conflicts in the country. The government at all levels of governance has not preoccupied themselves with the

fundamental issues and objective conditions of the Nigerian polity, which probably are the root causes of these conflicts. Consequently, a much-needed system of re-examination and correction, which are part of the vital ingredients for conflict mitigation within a given polity, are yet to form part of the Nigerian political culture (Afegbua 2014).

Socio-cultural and Religious Dimension

Social-cultural aspects of a society are key in ensuring a balanced level of satisfaction and trust for the government. However, their imbalance or inequalities are detrimental to the stability and national security of any country. Socio-cultural imbalances encompasses lack of access to a range of services including education, health and housing, lack of basic infrastructure and inequalities in societal or cultural hierarchy (i.e. major and minor ethnic groups). Cultural status refers to the differences in recognition and (*de facto*) hierarchical status of different groups' cultural norms, customs and practices. Social inequalities and associated problems are significant in many parts of the northern and southern regions of Nigeria (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007).

Inter-religious confrontations and the proliferation of sectional groupings in the last 54 years of Nigeria's nationhood are other sources of tension and instability in the polity. Religious extremism, fanaticism and intolerance in some parts of the country, is an extension of inter-ethnic, inter-communal conflicts (Afegbua 2014). Boko Haram thrives on this in that it tries to gain legitimacy and authority using a religious background. This strategy by the group has been adjudged by many to be relatively successful because of the sensitivity of religious matters in Nigeria. Socio-cultural issues, like inter-ethnic struggles over matters that borders on public office and resource sharing, take another

coloration in the formation of ethnic militias. Their formation and goals merely reinforced the primordial and socio-cultural agenda of the ethnic groups they represent, all due to NG's passive attitude in addressing socio-cultural matters in Nigeria.

The northern region of Nigeria is predominantly a Muslim dominated region. Compared to the southern region, which is predominantly Christian, access to social amenities and conditions of living are poor. While attention is paid to ensuring equity in political and bureaucratic offices that mostly concerns the elite, not much attention has been given to promote equity socio-culturally, as is evident in most parts of the country, especially the north. Though political and bureaucratic inequalities are more emotive and draw the attention of the media, social inequalities affect the lives of more people. Social inequalities have complex causes and have become entrenched in Nigeria's national life.

Although some parts of the country are relatively peaceful, compared to other places, and the relationship between the indigenes and settlers is harmonious; however, there is evidence of the existence of inequalities between indigenes and settlers with discriminatory practices mainly based on socio-cultural factors, ethnic and religious divides. Research also revealed that basic amenities are not equitably distributed as the settler settlements are neglected in terms of the provision of such amenities, lacking access roads and good schools (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewards 2007).

The distinct but obvious socio-cultural differences between the three major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo), given their numerical preponderance, is of huge political significance. The size of the population in terms of the different regions is an important dimension of the ethnic balance of power. With the Hausa-Fulani (north) comprising almost half of the total population of Nigeria, while Yoruba and Igbos

comprising the remaining balance of the regional populations, there is sufficient numerical advantage to ensure political dominance by the majority ethnic group. There is also evidence that non-indigenes in some cities in parts of Nigeria are disenfranchised (Langer Mustapha, and Stewart 2007). The key to ranking this characteristic would be how the population views measures by the central government to remove social barriers and guarantee full inclusion in the socioeconomic and political process.

Economic Dimension

The economic and industrial dimensions of conflict are caused by the incessant industrial resentments by labor over the unfavorable government's economic and industrial policies. This has been another major source of disharmony in the system. Contentious issues have always been those concerned with location of services and official economic policies. Since 1999, no year has gone by without a major industrial conflict (Afegbua 2014). The governments at all levels have very poor records of managing industrial disagreements and unrest, between it and labor unions, in the country. The government, even under a democratic administration, lacks proactive strategies and skills in managing such crises until they escalate into uncontrollably violent levels.

A sequel to the economic dimension, that involves strike actions embarked by labor unions, which serves as a motivation and reason to join any insurgent group, is the issue of economic deprivation and marginalization. The result is a high level of poverty manifested in lack of access to basic amenities like water, food, shelter and education. The youth and undergraduate unemployment level is very alarming. This is due to the passive attention given to this area by the NG. Most youth are unsure of their future in the

country. An online journal, *Brookings*, in its edition on *(Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: A Situation Analysis)* put it this way:

> [T]he National Population Commission (NPC, 2013) states about half of Nigeria's population of about 167 million is made up of youth, defined as individuals between 15 and 34 years of age. Unfortunately, as the youth population grows, so does the unemployment rate . . . unemployed youths numbered about 11.1 million in 2012 . . . younger youth struggle even more to find jobs: At least two-thirds of unemployed youth are between 15 and 24 years of age. And, in terms of gender**,** available statistics show that a majority of unemployed youth are female . . . women accounted for more than 50 percent of unemployed youth between 2008 and 2012. (Akande 2014)

The trend is a breeding factor for recruitment and sympathizers of the cause of insurgent and terrorist groups. Resentment invariably grows among the unemployed youth towards the government's inability to tackle this problem. Economic deprivation can be discussed by three concepts: relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequalities (HI). The notion of relative deprivation is defined as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they think they can actually get. Simply put, it is the disparity between aspirations and achievements (Gurr 1970). Polarization occurs when two groups exhibit great intergroup heterogeneity (a word that signifies diversity) combined with intra-group homogeneity (the state of having identical cumulative distribution function or values). HI are inequalities among groups of people that share a common identity. Such inequalities have economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions, each of which contains a number of elements (Stewart 2010). The notion of HI between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and so on, is thought to be an important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife (Murshed and Pavan 2009).

Economic inequalities in Nigeria are severe and its core poverty level is high, especially in the northeast (where Boko Haram operates), as compared to the southeast. Some of these inequalities can be traced to the biased allocation of government projects and grants and differential access to key sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas, and telecommunications. Others are the unintended consequences of macroeconomic policies. Dynamic areas accumulate advantages, while deprived areas do the opposite through this polarization effect (Langer Mustapha, and Stewart 2007).

Matrix of Analysis

A sample matrix is included below to highlight certain variables excerpted from the RAND study and grouped under the three dimensions of political, economic and socio-cultural. The purpose is to identify the factors that are key drivers to the rise of BH and MEND (as will be explained further in chapter 4), and the NG's response and the level of effectiveness. This, the author deems very important, as it gives the reader the foundation to assess the significance of this research, and the need for a whole-of-government approach in countering terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

The variables will be scored either 0 for non-present, or 1 for present. It should be noted that the non-present or 0 mark signifies a situation where the impact of the variable in the society, vice-a-vise the NG's response, is either absent completely, or at best, barely felt by the people. On the other hand, the present or 1 grade includes a situation where the impact of the variable is present in the society and the NG's response is noticed, satisfactory or high. Some of the variables (like poverty level, employment level and corruption level, among others) will be graded based on statistics, while others will

be graded based on the author's experience, print and electronic media analysis and people's views.

It should be noted that the aim of this research is not to disprove the importance of a military approach in CT/COIN, neither is it to discredit the efforts by the NG in addressing some of these issues. As a matter of fact, no CT/COIN has been effective without a military phase in it. However, the emphasis is that the purpose of the military phase is to create conditions for a political approach. In addition, emphasis is also placed on identifying socio-political factors that are drivers of insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria, with a view to stressing the importance of a proactive rather than reactive strategy. The author contends that if a whole-of-government approach is deliberately devised to tackle these socio-political factors, the BH and MEND insurgencies will be degraded, and eventually destroyed.

Table 1. Sample Matrix

BOKO HARAM	**Homegrown Insurgency 2002-2009**	**Increasing Violence and Internationalism 2010-2015**	**Allegiance to ISIS 2015 - Beyond**
FACTOR	PHASE ONE	PHASE TWO	PHASE THREE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
POLITICAL DIMENSION			
Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict			
Government a functional democracy			
Government a partial or transitional democracy			
Free and fair elections held			
Government respected human rights and allowed free press			
Amnesty or reward program in place			
Majority of citizens in area of conflict viewed government as legitimate			
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict			
Government provided better governance than insurgents in area of conflict			
COIN force and government had different goals/levels of commitment			
Government/state was competent			
ECONOMIC DIMENSION			
Expropriable cash crops or mineral wealth in area of conflict			
Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by government			
Perception of Government's economic policies in affected areas			
Investment opportunities			
Poverty issues addressed by government			

SOCIO - CULTURAL DIMENSION			
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict			
Government provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas it controlled or claimed to control			
Government's health policies in affected areas			
Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claimed to control			
Employment level in the society			
Perception of Government's educational policies in affected areas			
Harmonious living between settlers and indigenes in affected areas			
Government is trusted by the people in affected areas			
Optimism of change by the Government			
Government provided improved infrastructure			

Source: Created by author, using matrix from Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

Note: Interpretation of grading to be used

Grades	Interpretation	Remarks
0	Non Present	Non-present signifies a situation where the impact of the variable in the society is barely felt by the people of is completely absent.
1	Present	May include a situation where impact of the variable in the society is satisfactory or is noticed.

Using the National Defense Research Institute (RAND's) *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, the variables were selected and grouped under three dimensions, in a view to analyzing the NG's CT/COIN from a socio-

political perspective. This is not far-fetched from the fact that the reason(s) for the emergence of BH are socio-political. The response by the military has been able to effectively provide physical security in the affected region, especially engaging in military aid to civil authority roles. However, the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria still persist, hence, the need to identify some key factors that have been passively addressed or totally ignored by the NG. The purpose of the matrix is to give the reader a basic idea of some socio-political variables used by BH and MEND as the basis for their existence, as well as NG's response in tackling the issues.

Summary of Chapter 3

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the methodology used in this monograph, with a brief analysis of some variables and their distinctive characteristics. The variables are grouped under political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions. The reasons for the various characteristics and their relevance to the research are also explained in this chapter. The methodology is based on the National Defense Research Institute (RAND's) *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, published in 2010. The companion volume, entitled *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* is a very useful supplementary tool, and provides extensive detail on the methods used by RAND. Chapter 4 will analyze in detail the selected case studies in order to create a way for recommendations on what the NG needs to focus on in order to make its COIN strategy more effective against the rising trend of terrorism in the country.

A Preview of the Structure of MEND and Boko Haram Case Studies in Chapter 4

The case studies discussed in chapter 4 will include an overall summary of each phase of each insurgency with key factors, conventional explanations of the outcome, and a list of distinct features of the case. The distinct features are one or more distinctive, exceptional, or unique aspects of the case's history that are critical to understanding the outcome (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b). Additionally a chart with a list of variables marked in rankings of 0 or 1 per phase and per case will be included. The author will then use information and trends found during the analysis of the case studies, to proffer effective socio-political measures that the Government of Nigeria can adopt in order to make its CT/COIN strategy more effective.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This thesis intends to address the need for a more robust socio-political approach to Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy in tackling the menace of Boko Haram (and other insurgent groups) in the country. Similarly, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the activities of insurgent groups in Nigeria, using Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) as the case studies. To achieve this, the analytical format of the case studies found in the National Defense Research Institute (RAND)'s *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* and *Victory Has a Thousand Father: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* has been adapted and used in this analysis. The variables already identified in the chapter 3 will be analyzed using current evidence from reports, all with a view to ascertain the existing trends of the menace, which will aid building a case for the need of a socio-political approach to COIN in Nigeria.

Each of the two case studies will include a narrative, phasing and distinct characteristics for each phase. In addition, each narrative will begin with explanations for the success or failure of the COIN strategy, as the starting point for looking at the socio-political factors to make NG's CT strategy more effective. These assessments are based on the author's review of the existing sources and not the Nigerian Government's official viewpoint, and a determination to identify the level of effectiveness of the Government's socio-political approach in tackling insurgencies.

Even though this thesis aims to recommend effective socio-political approaches that the NG can adopt in order to make its already existing CT strategy more effective, it

important to assess the NG's CT/COIN approach. This is to aid in assessing whether each phase was successful or not, in order to proffer recommendations based on the strengths and weaknesses. At the end, each case will be rated based on the variables listed, (see table 1, chapter 3), followed by a brief description of the distinct characteristics. Owing to the fact that the insurgencies in Nigeria are still on going, assessments will be based on the effects so far achieved up to the first quarter of 2015.

Nigeria's strategy in tackling insecurity has heavily been by the use of force (military instrument of national power). The author recognizes that a passive approach or strategy in tackling some of the socio-political issues already highlighted in chapter 3, as well as an insufficient level of understanding of the dynamics, strengths and weaknesses of the groups, is a contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of the NG's CT/COIN strategy. A heavy military approach alone is a way to tackling the problem but over the years, it has proven to be less than effective.

While the Nigerian state is primarily responsible for the provision of security, Nigerian citizens have a big role to play in order to collectively support the country's security agencies because security is everybody's business. This calls for vigilance on the part of all citizens. However, the big question is: What is the level of trust between the Government and the people of Nigeria, or better still, do the people of Nigeria trust and have confidence in the Government?

In his book, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*, John Campbell (a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Senior Fellow and Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria) stated:

> Governance, let alone democracy, faces grievous, structural challenges in Nigeria . . . popular alienation and a fragmented establishment have contributed to Nigeria becoming one of the most religious and, at the same time, one of the most

> violent countries in the world . . . the United States should employ a strategy of 'soft diplomacy,' which includes facilitating more exchanges and providing more grants to those actively working to create a democratic culture . . . U.S. support of the National Assembly, the court system, and carefully vetted state governments that are practicing good governance through targeted assistance programs. (Campbell 2010)

Campbell further identified several key factors that act as pointers to possible instability, including increased violence; widespread human insecurity, and the corruption and fraud associated with the conduct of elections at all levels of governance (Campbell 2010). Campbell's suggestion was more of a socio-political approach to tackling the problem of insecurity that has bedeviled the country.

A detailed knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of insurgent groups will stand as a potential key to neutralizing the organizations. It is the knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of BH and MEND that the NG, through political maneuvering or negotiations and military actions, would be able to exploit to obtain desired goals. A possible way at gaining an upper edge over these groups, in order to ensure an effective COIN strategy socio-politically, is by working more closely with the populace, local and religious leaders in the affected areas.

In discussing these case studies, both Boko Haram and MEND were evaluated based on a set of variables dealing with the NG's CT/COIN or insurgent techniques established by RAND. The evaluation of these variables will be in each case study and phases, with both the variable designation and the phasing determined by the author. However, it should be noted that a concrete position of Presence or Absence of each variable might not be made in some instances.

The authors of the RAND study addressed the issue of possible errors in the marking of the Presence or Absence of variables in Appendix C of *Victory Has A*

Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency. Similarly, this author acknowledges that some variables relating to Boko Haram and MEND will possibly be scored incorrectly. However, the author of this study, as the authors of the RAND study, are confident that the robustness of the findings will negate any concerns about minor errors.

Boko Haram Case Study

Case Summary: Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, which later became the Boko Haram sect, is an insurgent militant group that operates in Nigeria's northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. There are some disparities regarding the actual year that the sect came into existence. To address this issue, this study will consider 2002 as the period when the group began. It was in 2002 that the group first started in and around Maiduguri, Borno State (Nigeria), as a radical group at the Ndimi mosque. They promoted themselves as a liberator of the people from the ills of the society, particularly the government, which they saw as irredeemably corrupt. In the middle of 2002, the group, under its founder, Mohammed Ali, embarked on a hijra to Kanama in Yobe state (in Islam, a hijra is a journey from the bad world to go and be closer to God). This, we can say, marks the beginning of the group (Africa is a Country 2014).

The objective of the group is to establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law. Their agenda was to begin from the northern states and then spread their influence to the rest of the country. The group operates in an agrarian northern environment characterized by a scarcity of natural resources, insufficient infrastructure, lack of basic amenities, a high level of illiteracy, unemployment and corruption. The NG strategy was

the use of the Military or COIN forces (the Joint Task Force (JTF), Nigerian police, military and Para-military forces) which are dispatched to the north-east.

Phase One: Homegrown Insurgency (2002 to July 27, 2009)

The *hijra*, by the group in 2002, is seen as the beginning of indoctrination. The position of most scholars on BH is that the basis for its formation was to build a society and government guided by the dictates of Sharia Law. The first recorded activities of the group were towards the end of 2003, when the group had a communal clash with the Kanama community over fishing rights. The group grew "increasingly at odds with the secular authorities" (Forest 2012). This act led to police involvement. In the crisis which followed, the group overpowered the police, which in turn led to the involvement of the Nigerian Army. The group was defeated, with its founder, Mohammed Ali, was killed. This forced the group to scatter, with a few of the survivors, including Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, moving north to Maiduguri. The group later reintegrated in Maiduguri under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, who started the process of starting a new mosque without molestation (Africa is a Country 2014).

Between early 2004 and 2009, Boko Haram grew as a movement primarily because they went underground and were largely left alone. Their recruitment strategy was effective this period because they started a farm, provided welfare for those members who could not work, gave training to those who could. In summary, they provided an alternative to the government of the day, and this very viability attracted more members, and a lot of donations from prominent members of the Northern elites (Africa is a

Country 2014). The group initially appeared as a harmless one, with no tendencies of any acts of violence. However, that changed with time.

During this phase, a significant incident which brought BH to prominence, characterized by violence, was in 2007, when Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam was murdered. Ja'afar had started criticizing them and predicted that someday, because of their extremist ideologies, they would clash with the government. It is generally believed that Mohammed Yusuf ordered his murder. Two years after Sheikh Ja'afar's assassination, the group was largely "left alone, growing, and attracting more followers" (Africa is a Country 2014).

In February 2009, the government of Ali Modu Sheriff, then Governor of Borno State (Nigeria), banned the riding of motorcycles without the use of helmets. This seemingly innocuous event is what led to the meltdown. This led to a clash between the group and members of the Nigerian Police (NP) in Maiduguri metropolis during the burial of one of their members. Subsequently, a series of attacks were carried out by the group in Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe states, killing several policemen and disrupting normal activities. Eventually, the army was drafted into the scene and normalcy was restored. Several BH members were arrested, including their leader, Mohammed Yusuf. However, Mohammed Yusuf was extra-judicially killed "while trying to escape," by the NP after he was handed over to them (Africa is a Country 2014). This incidence is adjudged as the end of phase one and the beginning of phase two.

Assessment: BH was initially formed as a "liberation" group (though tied to religion) as a result of socio-political dissatisfaction. As a result, the group's aim of correcting the ills of the society and government can be said to be the major component

of its foundation and subsequent expansion. The COIN forces (beginning with the NP) were called into action to tackle the group. It is the author's opinion that the events discussed above and the actions by the NG, proves the assertion of this thesis that a purely military approach to CT provides only a temporal solution, hence the need for a robust socio-political approach to the CT/COIN strategy in Nigeria.

Phases Two: Increase in Violence and Internationalism (2010 to 2015)

The group's absence was not for long. After a year, they resurfaced in early 2010. By this time, the group was under a new leadership, Abubakar Shekau, who was Mohammed Yusuf's second-in-command. Shekau decided that there could be no negotiations with such a government and set about reorganizing the group. He adapted the Al-Qaeda model, splitting the group into cells which are largely independent of each other (Africa is a Country 2014). Its modus operandi changed, with a dynamic nature of threats and renewed attacks on Nigerian government forces, facilities and western targets. Some analysts mark 2010 as the point at which Boko Haram increased its attacks on Christian targets (U.S. Congress 2012).

The beginning of phase two was a period that had the intelligence community linking the group to other international jihadist and terrorist movements, both in Africa and the Middle East. Scholars also identify the group's growing connection with the world wide terrorist network and argue that this display of solidarity with jihadist groups operating outside of Nigeria marked a severe revision of Boko Haram's operational strategy under a new leadership (Elkaim 2013).

Sequel to the above, a key indicator of the group's increasing internationalism was its choice of targets, in particular, the United Nations building in Abuja (Nigeria), which the group bombed on August 26, 2011, killing 18 people with several others injured (BBC Africa 2011). The group also enjoyed an unhindered increase in the flow of support and recruits that it received across borders (Elkaim 2013). Some other characteristics of these phases of BH's insurgency are beheadings of captured persons (especially Christians), increased violence on vulnerable communities and market places, the use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices, the use of information technology for propaganda messages and the desire to create a decreased sense of public safety.

The group's aim of gaining international recognition was achieved as its profile grew. There was an increased attention of the United States Congress to the group's activities, with it culminating into the official designation of three Boko Haram commanders as terrorists by the United States Department of State (U.S. Congress 2012). Significantly, scores of men, women and children were also killed in the Nigerian towns of Baga and Doron Baga, on January 3, 2015 when Boko Haram militants launched a fierce attack. The exact number of dead remains unknown, but claims vary from 150 up to 2,000 people killed (BBC Africa 2015a). Furthermore, the group's current structure under Abubakar Shekau can be described as a cellular structure, with no centralized command, and seemingly no unity of purpose. This lack of unity makes them particularly difficult to negotiate with, as one cannot ascertain who exactly represents the group. As things stand, the extremist elements within Boko Haram are the ones fully in control of the narrative.

According to CIA officials, BH has an estimated 9,000 fighters, and cells that are specialized in bombings. Through its raids on military bases and banks, it has gained control of vast amounts of weapons and money. In April 2014, Boko Haram drew international condemnation by abducting more than 200 schoolgirls from Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS), Chibok, Borno state (northeast Nigeria), saying it would treat them as slaves and forcefully marry them off, a reference to an ancient Islamic belief that women captured in conflict are considered war booty (BBC 2015c). As of 2015, the BH insurgency has claimed about 13,000 lives and forced at least 1.5 million people to flee their homes (The Guardian 2015).



Figure 3. Reported Civilian Deaths in Boko Haram Attacks Sep 2010 to Apr 2014

Source: Radio National, "Reported Civilian Deaths in Boko Haram Attacks, September 2010-April 2014." May 22, 2014, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/rvn-a174835252civiliandeathinboko624jpg/5471570.

Phase Three: Allegiance to the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) 2015 and Beyond

This phase, which is presently ongoing concurrently with phase two, is a new phase in the group's jihadist movement. Previously viewed as an outcast in the global jihadi community, Boko Haram is perhaps ISIS's biggest affiliate now. The group, through an audio message purported to be from its leader, Abubakar Shekau, pledged their allegiance to ISIS. This move is aimed at solidifying the group's legitimacy internationally because ISIS already has more international legitimacy as a global caliphate. In addition to legitimacy, the group's allegiance to ISIS will help in its recruiting, funding and logistics as it expands into French-speaking West Africa (CNN 2015b).

Boko Haram has had two main factions-one led by Shekau and the other comprising former members of Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot. Ansaru had been operating from around 2012 as the Nigerian wing of AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). After the French-led intervention in Mali in 2013, a significant number of Ansaru members re-integrated with Shekau. The prerequisite for Boko Haram joining the ISIS coalition was a coming together of these two factions. The result was the formation of a unified general command between the two factions and the bridging of some ideological differences between the al Qaeda-like Ansaru and the ultra-extreme *takfiri* -like Shekau (CNN 2015a).

The implications of this merger are numerous, however, it is important to note that BH's means of reaching its end state does not solidly rest on just fighting COIN forces in the north east in order to establish a caliphate governed by Sharia Law. It may be ironic, but it is the author's opinion that the group is adopting diplomacy as a key

instrument of power. Its allegiance to ISIS buttresses this fact that internationalization and external support gives the group a long-term image, unlike the Maitatsine Islamic extremist group (Nigeria) of the early 1980s that was wiped out within a short period of time by the NG security forces.

Assessment: The summer of 2009 witnessed the group engaged in a number of attacks in the north, on security agencies and agents, government installations, churches and schools, apparently in response to police brutality (Forest 2012). Conflicts with the group and the Nigerian COIN forces deployed to the region resulted in several deaths and internally displaced persons (IDP).

Nigeria has so far opted for a reactive posture in dealing with an aggressive and active terrorist group like Boko Haram. Where will the next terror attack be? Such a question seems to not resonate with the country's counterterrorism strategy, whether hard or soft. The NG's COIN strategy, within the phases two and three periods, had predominantly been a military approach to CT/COIN. The measure of the NG's ineffectiveness is obvious, with the group growing in strength, capabilities and influence not just in Nigeria alone, but in the neighboring West African countries of Chad, Cameroun and Niger. A whole-of-government approach in tackling the menace in the northern region in its earliest form could have degraded, if not eliminated the group.

Conventional Explanations

Owing to the emergence of the group (as explained in the different phases), it can be said that the group's emergence in Nigeria was as a result socio-political factors. A perceived government infected by corrupt and biased leaders, societal inequalities or injustices both between and within regions, unbalanced economic development, high rate

of unemployment and illiteracy, resulting in a lack of trust for the NG. These, among others, were some of the factors that fuelled the group's desire for a more complete implementation of Sharia Law in order to sanitize the system.

Additionally, the high handedness of the COIN forces deployed to the region, coupled with the extra-judicial killing of the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, by the Nigerian Police, further contributed to the group's resentment of the NG. These acts only helped in fuelling the already existing sentiments among most of the northerners that the NG was neglectful towards the affairs of the region. The effects of these ills were a fertile environment for the recruitment of disenfranchised and unemployed youth.

The NG's approach to tackling the BH menace in the northern region has been reactive rather than proactive in nature. In addition to the reactive nature of the NG's strategy, the military has always been seen as the center of gravity in the Nigeria's CT/COIN. Boko Haram might metamorphosed into a violent group in 2009, but it took the Nigerian government around five years to craft what is now known as the soft power approach to CT, an approach that places emphasis on the adoption of non-military strategies in the fight against insurgency and terror. This clearly demonstrates its rather reactive posture to such threats (Kwalja 2014). The Nigerian government's inability to address the root causes of the grievance resulted in the continuation of the conflict.

With its reactive posture to emergency response and preparedness, Nigeria's security apparatus has found it increasingly difficult to gain the public's confidence and trust–a fact only abetted by the numerous inconveniences often borne by its citizenry, including stop and searches along the country's highways and searches conducted in the course of their daily business in the cities. While insurgents are somewhat tactically

proficient and well-coordinated in their attacks, they often face security services that are either at a loss on what to do or, at worst, overwhelmed by the situation. As a prerequisite to combating insurgencies and terror, the question of state capacity needs to be seriously revisited within the context of its coercive and non-coercive functions, both in terms of its control over the instruments of force on one hand, and its responsibility as a provider of public goods on the other (Kwalja 2014).

Distinctive Characteristics

The Nigerian Police Force, as part of the COIN forces, extra-judicially killed the group's leader Mohammed Yusuf, which caused a temporal disruption in command and control of the organization. COIN forces and the Government of Nigeria were unable or unwilling to ensure the provision of basic services to the impoverished north of Nigeria. As time passed, there was increased violence and evidence of a growing international connection with the global terrorist networks. Heavy-handed tactics on the part of the COIN force receives national and international attention and condemnation (Knobel 2013).

The matrix shows the variables based on the different dimensions of political, economic, and socio-cultural. The author tries to identify the presence or absence of key variables that will help in supporting the fact that a whole-of-government approach has been given little or no attention in the NG's CT/COIN strategy. The outcome leaves the reader convinced as to the need for a more robust socio-political approach by the NG in order to make its CT/COIN strategy more effective.

The matrix analysis is divided into three dimensions, political, economic and socio-cultural. The political dimension identifies the NG's structures and actions that are

meant to positively impact the lives of the people. The economic variables highlight the impact of policies and investment opportunities in the society, specifically, the affected areas. The socio-cultural dimension identifies some variables that have a direct impact on the people. These variables are key factors that stress the significance of a whole-of-government approach in Nigeria's CT/COIN strategy.

Table 2. Matrix for Boko Haram

BOKO HARAM	**Homegrown Insurgency 2002-2009**	**Increasing Violence and Internationalism 2010-2015**	**Allegiance to ISIS 2015 - Beyond**
FACTOR	PHASE ONE	PHASE TWO	PHASE THREE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
POLITICAL DIMENSION			
Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	1
Government a functional democracy	1	0	1
Government a partial or transitional democracy	0	0	1
Free and fair elections held	1	0	1
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	0	0	1
Amnesty or reward program in place	0	0	0
Majority of citizens in area of conflict viewed government as legitimate	0	0	1
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict	0	0	1
Government provided better governance than insurgents in area of conflict	1	1	1
COIN force and government had different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
Government/state was competent	0	0	1

ECONOMIC DIMENSION			
Expropriable cash crops or mineral wealth in area of conflict	0	0	0
Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by government	0	0	0
Perception of Government's economic policies in affected areas	0	0	0
Investment opportunities	0	0	0
Poverty issues addressed by government	0	0	0
SOCIO - CULTURAL DIMENSION			
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict	0	0	1
Government provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas it controlled or claimed to control	0	0	0
Government's health policies in affected areas	0	0	0
Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claimed to control	1	0	0
Employment level in the society	0	0	0
Perception of Government's educational policies in affected areas	1	0	0
Harmonious living between settlers and indigenes in affected areas	0	0	0
Government is trusted by the people in affected areas	1	0	0
Optimism of change by the Government	1	1	1
Government provided improved infrastructure	0	0	0

Source: Created by author, using matrix from Paul, Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

Note: Interpretation of grading to be used

Grades	Interpretation	Remarks
0	Non Present	Non Present signifies a situation where the impact of the variable in the society is barely felt by the people of is completely absent.
1	Present	May include a situation where impact of the variable in the society is satisfactory or is noticed.

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (2005 to the Present)

Case Summary: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a group agitating for an equitable distribution of wealth in the resource rich Niger Delta region (Nigeria), and protesting the widespread ecological degradation that has resulted from natural resource extraction (oil and gas) and the lack of sustainable economic development in the region. The group launched itself into the international stage in January 2006 by claiming responsibility for the capture of four foreign oil workers. Since then, the group's attacks on oil pipelines and kidnappings have reduced oil output in the Niger Delta by roughly one-third. Oil companies, the Nigerian government, and the United States are concerned about the MEND's ability to disrupt the global oil supply. Though skilled at leveraging international media, the group remains secretive and opinions vary on its power and ability to sustain itself (Hanson 2007).

Phase One: Pre-Amnesty, late 2005 to Summer 2009

Generally, the Niger Delta has attracted considerable multidisciplinary attention and therefore has a rich literature. The literature on the Niger Delta agrees that the oil industry has not promoted the development of the region; rather, it has undermined the

area's development. This gave rise to yet another liberation group to address these socio-economic and political factors. An obvious contrast is that the region is rich in resources but most of the people live in wrenching poverty. The people's rights have come under severe assault by the ecologically unfriendly practices of oil transnational corporations (TNC). In addition, state laws and policies, as they relate to petroleum resources, expropriate the indigenous peoples of the Niger Delta of their right to their natural resources (Olusola 2013). The people have become frustrated and aggressive when their goals and aspirations are not achieved. Thus, the emergence of the group is no doubt related to the issues discussed above.

As Nigeria began to prepare for independence (1960), the search for oil began in the Delta in the 1950s and by 1956 it was discovered in commercial quantities. Less than two years later it was being commercially produced and sold on the international markets. Today around two million barrels of oil are extracted in the Niger Delta every day making it the world's eighth largest oil producer in a country that remains one of the world's poorest as the oil revenues largely bypass those living and working outside that industry. Foreign companies extract the oil and it has been alleged that they do so without regard for local cultures or the local environment which has been ravaged by oil spills, fires, pollution, deforestation and poor waste management (Olusola 2013).

Big oil spills are no longer news in the Niger Delta, where the wealth underground is out of all proportion with the poverty on the surface. It is estimated that the oil spillage in the region has endured the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some estimates. The oil pours out nearly every week, and some swamps are long since lifeless, so the people here cast a jaundiced, if apathetic, eye at the

spill in the gulf. As many as 546 million gallons of oil spilled into the Niger Delta over the last five decades, or nearly 11 million gallons a year, as concluded in a 2006 report. By comparison, the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 dumped an estimated 10.8 million gallons of oil into the waters off Alaska (The New York Times 2010).

The MEND's activities in Nigeria's Niger Delta therefore is mostly motivated by socio-economic and political factors ranging from frustration created by deprivation, to threats to the life goals of individuals or groups of people in the region. Oil, as expected, has not brought prosperity, better living conditions, government attention and development. Rather, it has been accompanied by instability, insecurity, conflict, violence, crime, environmental devastation and social tension. The Niger Delta is characterized by the absence of infrastructure, social services, non-oil industries and even petroleum products. There is widespread neglect, social and economic underdevelopment. The region is one of the least developed in the nation. It has only 2 percent of the Federal roads and less than 30 to 40 percent of settlements have electricity. In some areas, existing primary health care facilities serve as little as 2 percent of the population. Educational facilities are inadequate in most communities. There is huge infrastructure underdevelopment. The prices of refined petroleum products are of the highest in the country. There is endemic poverty (Olusola 2013).

Despite the fact that there have been operations conducted by militias and protesters since the 1970s in the oil rich Delta region, this case study will commence with the public emergence of MEND in late 2005, just prior to their first claimed attack in early 2006. MEND targets were overwhelmingly oil related infrastructure and foreign oil workers, resulting in a significant reduction of production, which in turn impacted the

revenues of the Government of Nigeria. MEND forces were significantly militarily dominant over the COIN force.

It is argued by some analysts that the group's goals have further extended from fighting for socio-economic equality of the Niger Delta region to participating in politics, as indicated by the Council on Foreign Relations' website. The group's modus operandi includes attacks on foreign oil companies operating in the area, kidnapping of foreigners, sabotage and attacks. Illegal oil bunkering is commonplace by various elements, including the solely criminal, in the Delta.

Illegal oil bunkering, which is the process through which crude oil or refined petroleum products are illegally siphoned from pipelines and sold to interested dealers waiting on the high sea or to unscrupulous individuals. Attacks on oil infrastructure result in significant loss of oil revenues for the foreign oil companies operating in the area and for the Nigerian government. According to President Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria), an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil per day (out of 2.2m barrels per day), or almost 20 percent of all Nigeria's production, is being lost at a cost to the state and oil companies of around £1bn a month (about US $1.6 billion)–more than is spent on education and the health of the nation's 168 million people. Not only is Nigerian oil theft helping to keep the world price of oil high, it is causing corruption and social disorder in the country (The Guardian 2013).

Some experts believe that MEND is unique among other Delta militants because it sought to portray itself as defending the rights of the people of the Niger Delta against the predatory and corrupt Nigerian government and foreign energy companies. Alliances between insurgent groups, and between branches of MEND, are fluid, frequent,

opportunistic, and can be short-lived (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism 2012a). Prior to the Amnesty program launched in the summer of 2009, the Joint Task Force (JTF), dispatched to the Delta in 2004, was the primary way the NG countered the insurgency.

Phase Two: Post-Amnesty, August 2009 to the Present

The Niger Delta militancy, anchored by the MEND, erupted into a major crisis that negatively affected the nation in many ways. The crisis cracked relations within and between communities and various social groups in the Niger Delta, oil companies and the Nigerian State. The crisis also affected jobs and job creation in the Niger Delta, as oil companies withdrew from areas of operation and shut down production activities and new businesses consider the area one of high risk. Primarily for the NG, the crisis resulted in huge revenue losses through the shutdown of production activities, vandalization and damage of oil facilities, and illegal oil bunkering. The NG then understood that the all-military approach in defeating the insurgents was less effective, thus, the need to come up with a socio-political approach.

On June 26, 2009, the NG announced an amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta, which would last for 60 days, beginning on August 6, 2009 and ending October 4, 2009. Former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua signed the amnesty after consultation with the National Council of State. During the 60 day period, armed youths surrendered their weapons to the Government in return for training and rehabilitation by the government (BBC Africa 2009). By the end of 2012, at least 26,368 former militants had benefitted in some way from the amnesty program. Many

former militants have enrolled for formal education while many others have undergone vocational training within and outside the country (Global Security 2013).

In an online journal, *Niger Delta Politics,* the writer summarizes this phase in these words:

> In televised ceremonies, guerrillas dropped off rifles, machine guns, tear-gas canisters, dynamite bundles, rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, gunboats and grenades to be sold to the government, which also offered the nonviolence training courses and nine-month vocational classes. Theft fell sharply. Yet now, just as Nigeria's state oil company has begun institutionalizing pipeline-watch jobs for some ex-militants, theft has blossomed again . . . it's quite an escalation. If nothing is done, it will continue to increase because more and more people will just come to feel that this is a gold field. . . . We're not going to give up on this and run away from it. We believe it can be stopped. (Niger Delta Politics, 2012)



Figure 4. Oil Production and Consumption in Nigeria, 1995 to 2011

Source: Encyclopedia of Earth, "Energy Profile of Nigeria," October 11, 2007, accessed June5, 2015, http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152513/.

The government-sponsored amnesty program in 2009 yielded temporary results. Most militant groups in the Niger Delta accepted the offer of amnesty in 2009, and the overall level of violence there declined, but oil theft, a lucrative criminal industry, has drawn many militants, new and old, back into the creeks. This is probably due to the fact that the follow-on rehabilitation programs of the amnesty failed to deliver alternative economic opportunities to former insurgents. Although the amnesty led to a sharp decline in attacks by militants, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies, gang wars, and fighting connected to the theft of crude oil, known as illegal oil bunkering, continued and contributed to the region's general insecurity and lack of economic vitality. On the whole, violence decreased, but attacks have continued by branches of MEND and other groups that are dissatisfied with the implementation of the amnesty program (Global Security 2013).

Conventional Explanations and Assessment

As a general principle, development and instability cannot go hand in hand. This means that the generalized crisis in the Niger Delta by MEND has had severe negative implications for the development of the area and Nigeria as a whole. The insurgency has had major implications economically, politically and socio-culturally both in the Niger Delta, in particular, and in Nigeria in general. The insurgency grew as a result of grievances arising mainly from a socio-cultural point of view. The NG's inability to address the root causes as well as a high level of injustice meted on the people by the locals themselves (traditional rulers and heads of community) and by NG officials aided the uncontrollable escalation of the MEND insurgency.

The NG's major source of revenue is from oil. Nigeria depends on oil exports for more than 80 percent of government revenue and 95 percent of foreign-exchange income (Bala-Gbogbo 2011). This brings up the issue of a single commodity economy instead of a diversified economy. The over-dependence on oil revenues by the NG, which comes from the Niger-Delta, has focused demands on the system and inevitably sharpened contradictions among different communal groupings in Nigeria. As a result, the politics of oil inevitably locks into the politics of communalism (Olusola 2013). On one hand, some corrupt government officials have used this factor as a means of fueling the crisis in the region in other to benefit from the spoils of illegalities. Some analysts and the militants themselves have criticized the amnesty program because it does little to address the core causes of the militancy and criminality that have plagued the Niger Delta for decades, such as the lack of education, jobs and basic services.

The purpose of the matrix below is to analyze NG's CT/COIN strategy based on the variables listed, with a view to accessing the level of the strategy's effectiveness. The variables are structured based on the different dimensions of political, economic, and socio-cultural. The presence or absence of scoring is key in justifying the need for an effective socio-political approach in tackling terrorism in Nigeria, in order to make its CT/COIN strategy more effective.

Table 3. Matrix For MEND

MEND	**Homegrown Insurgency 2002-2009**	**Increasing Violence and Internationalism 2010-2015**	**Allegiance to ISIS 2015 - Beyond**
FACTOR	PHASE ONE	PHASE TWO	PHASE THREE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
POLITICAL DIMENSION			
Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	1	1
Government a functional democracy	1	0	1
Government a partial or transitional democracy	0	0	1
Free and fair elections held	1	0	1
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	0	0	1
Amnesty or reward program in place	0	0	0
Majority of citizens in area of conflict viewed government as legitimate	0	0	1
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict	0	0	1
Government provided better governance than insurgents in area of conflict	1	1	1
COIN force and government had different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
Government/state was competent	0	0	1
ECONOMIC DIMENSION			
Expropriable cash crops or mineral wealth in area of conflict	0	0	0
Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by government	0	0	0
Perception of Government's economic policies in affected areas	0	0	0
Investment opportunities	0	0	0
Employment issue addressed by government	0	0	0
Poverty issues addressed by government	0	0	0

SOCIO - CULTURAL DIMENSION			
Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict	0	0	1
Government provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas it controlled or claimed to control	0	0	0
Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claimed to control	1	0	0
Employment level in the society	0	0	0
Perception of Government's educational policies in affected areas	1	0	0
Perception of Government's health policies in affected areas	0	0	0
Harmonious living between settlers and indigenes in affected areas	0	0	0
Government is trusted by the people in affected areas	1	0	0
Optimism of change by the Government	1	1	1
Government provided improved infrastructure	0	0	0

Source: Created by author, using matrix from Paul, Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

Note: Interpretation of grading to be used

Grades	Interpretation	Remarks
0	Non Present	Non Present signifies a situation where the impact of the variable in the society is barely felt by the people of is completely absent.
1	Present	May include a situation where impact of the variable in the society is satisfactory or is noticed.

It is evident from the above political, economic and socio-cultural variables that the NG has done little or nothing in tackling the root causes of the rise of BH and MEND in the country. The insignificant impact of government actions is the main reason why

most of the grades awarded in the variables are either non-present or insignificant. Hence, there is the need for a socio-political approach in Nigeria's fight against terrorism and insurgency.

Assessment of Case Studies and Matrixes

Insurgency in all its forms and manifestations constitute one of the most serious threats to peace and security in Nigeria. This chapter examined the conundrum evident with NG's CT/COIN strategy, specifically, the employment of its armed forces to contend with insurgencies. It argued that a purely military means is bound to be counterproductive. As such, the role of the military in counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria rests on a proper understanding of the nature of BH insurgency in the vortex of a globalized world with its peculiar characteristics. It also includes the need for a whole-of-government approach, which is key in identifying the political and socio-economic factors that are key to tackling the root causes of terrorism.

With few exceptions, the Nigerian Armed Forces have been configured, trained, and organized to fight a state-based adversary, although they have often been employed on various peace-support missions abroad. Terrorism and insurgency presents asymmetric warfare. Military history points that belligerents have always fought wars in ways that suit their best interest–politically, socially, culturally and technologically. As a consequence, warfare by definition has always been unbalanced and as such asymmetric. Such imbalance is imposed by its participants. The huge economic resource and oil infrastructure in the country, coupled with weak political and administrative structures, has made insurgency not only attractive but lucrative. Both extremes of the country

confront a major armed insurgency in an environment and terrain in which the Nigerian counterinsurgency forces are yet to attain success (Osakwe and Umoh 2013).

Political dissatisfaction caused by inequitable distribution of state power and resources is one of the basic causes of insurgency. Given the political nature of the problem of insurgency, David Galula wisely stated that counterinsurgency requires an approach that is 80 percent political and only 20 percent military (Galula 1964). A political solution to insurgency requires that attention be given to the people in the locale in which the insurgency is rooted and carried out. To further buttress this fact British General Sir Frank Kitson, stated that "the first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity" (Kitson 1977).

It is therefore pertinent to state that CT/COIN should not be seen as a blunt military effort that focuses solely on capturing and killing high value targets. It is not primarily about defeating an armed enemy; rather, its main objective is centered on establishing lasting stability in a state or region. This requires that violence and subversion should be brought to a level manageable by local security forces and at the same time, political, economic, and social institutions should be built to address the structural problems fomenting instability. To insurgents, war and politics are inseparable and concurrent. Insurgency exists because the government is perceived as being unresponsive and that the various groups decided it was in their best interest to adopt violence as a political act. Insurgents fight government forces only to the extent needed to achieve their political aims. Insurgent activity is therefore designed to weaken

government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence (Osakwe and Umoh 2013).

An important part of counterinsurgency in Nigeria demands a greater reliance on nonmilitary force. The exercise of military power should rather be used to create the space for political progress. While tackling armed insurgents, increasing efforts should be channeled to economic, social and infrastructural development in the bid to winning the hearts and minds of the local people. Using an international level of analysis, in the case of Iraq, there was recognition by the Bush Administration that non-military issues were important and that infrastructure mattered. As such, the United States intended reconstruction as a Marshall Plan for Iraq by providing clean water, communications, sanitation and power with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Hence the assertion that warfare goes beyond shock and awe (Osakwe and Umoh 2013).

The insurgency problem in Nigeria reflects a complex interaction between actions, structures, and beliefs. These dimensions should offer the needed framework for analyzing and comprehending insurgencies and crafting effective counter-strategies. The complex and unique interface between actions, structures, and beliefs determines the path of the insurgency and, in the end, dictates the outcome. To understand the nature of insurgency demands a three-dimensional outlook. Actions consist of those events, behaviors, and acts that characterize and form the visual tapestry of insurgencies. Structures are the conditions that frame an insurgency. Such conditions include corruption, oppression and deprivation. Beliefs comprise those attitudes, perceptions, prejudices, ideologies, worldviews, cultures, and social and individual identities that fuel insurgencies (Osakwe and Umoh 2013).

A comprehensive method for counterinsurgency in Nigeria should anchor an effective political reform, economic development, socio-cultural justice, to include balanced security. The difficulty in orchestrating the need for harmonious action of all these dimensions guarantees that in every situation a paradox confronts the government. If economic development occurs without security, then the government development projects may become insurgent magnets that insurgents must destroy in order to gain credibility. If security is gained without responsive economic development, insurgents will easily recruit the unemployed to fight the government. If security occurs without a rudimentary judicial system, then there is no ability to challenge authority peacefully. If the judicial system is organized but no political reforms undertaken, the insurgents would perceive no change in the status-quo and indeed a moderation of their grievance (Osakwe and Umoh 2013).

Summary of Chapter 4 and a Preview of Chapter 5

Boko Haram terrorism and MEND insurgency in Nigeria, with strongholds in northeastern and Niger Delta regions of Nigeria, emerged as a result of socio-political imbalance. The groups capitalized on weak government structures, marginalization (economically, socially, and politically) and a slow pace of government's approach to development in the affected regions. These factors, among others, led to dissatisfaction and frustration among the people, hence, the emergence of BH and MEND.

The analytical format of the case studies in the RAND model was adapted and used to form the basis for building a case for the need to have a robust socio-political approach to NG's CT/COIN strategy. The analysis highlighted the role that Nigeria's military has played so far in the fight against BH and MEND. However, the weaknesses

of a purely military approach in tackling the menace was stressed, owing to the fact that the result of this approach has only addressed the symptoms and not the root causes. This means that NG's counterinsurgency must combat these root causes.

For Nigeria's COIN strategy to be more effective, victory should not reside simply in the defeat of Boko Haram or MEND. It should involve a much broader outcome that reinstates and maintains stability, precluding the insurgency from re-emerging not because its fighters had been killed or suppressed, but because the conditions that sparked the insurgency have been degraded or eliminated (Osakwe and Umoh 2013). BH's insurgency is caused by actions, structures, and beliefs that feed on socio-political instability, ranging from a high level of corruption, social injustice, illiteracy and unemployment to lack of basic infrastructure.

The NG's reactive response (rather than a proactive reactive) have been detrimental to the fight against terrorism. Chapter 5 of this research provides a list of recommendations that the NG can adapt in order to make its counterterrorism strategy more effective. The recommendations generated are based on the outcome of the analysis of the political, economic and socio-cultural variables discussed in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis set out to identify a socio-political approach that the NG can adapt in order to make its national CT/COIN strategy more effective. This research was conducted with a view to making recommendations on how this rising trend of terrorism can be curtailed. A qualitative case study analysis of Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was conducted using the case study methodology of the National Defense Research Institute (RAND) in its study of insurgent groups and COIN operations in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* and *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*.

The author identified several factors under three dimensions (political, economic and socio-cultural), which singularly or in combination with other factors, contribute to the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. The variables discussed in chapter 4 were analyzed based on these dimensions because the emergence of BH (and MEND) was as a result of socio-political imbalance, ranging from high rate of corruption, poverty, lack of education, and infrastructure. In addition, social-political marginalization of groups because of race, religion, tribe, or creed and competition for economic resources among different groupings of society contributed to the menace of terrorism in Nigeria.

This chapter provides a review of chapter 4, as well as a summary and interpretation of the findings found in chapter 4, their implications, and recommendations for further study. Owing to the short falls in a purely military approach in tackling terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, the recommendations provided in this chapter are

structured under the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions, all in a view to strengthening the need for a robust socio-political approach in NG's CT/COIN strategy.

The Findings of Chapter 4

Based on the criteria established by RAND's study *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* and *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, this author has rated the NG's CT/COIN strategy as a one-sided, military-heavy approach. This approach provides a short-term gain or win, in which case, could be prolonging the fight against BH. In addition, the purely military approach does not address the factors that led to the group's emergence. Rather, it addresses the symptoms only and not the root causes of terrorism.

The analysis in chapter 4 compared BH and MEND groups, phases of their operations and negative effects in Nigeria. Key to the foundation of the analysis was the fact that some socio-political dissatisfactions in Nigeria are responsible for the existence of these groups. These factors include: an entrenched political, economic and social divide between the north and the south, high rate of illiteracy, resulting from lack of access to basic education, unemployment (especially among the youths), as well as poor infrastructure and lack of basic amenities. Key factors that remain at the epicenter of the spread of terrorism in Nigeria also include weak governmental structure, competition for economic resources, international influence (ISIS), and marginalization. These socio-political factors combine to set the stage for the rise of BH terrorist group in Nigeria.

Recommendations

Countering terrorism in Nigeria does not have a cut-and-paste solution. This assertion conforms to military history that solutions that worked in one area, under a certain set of conditions, could be disastrous under another set of conditions or in a different location. Even though the threat posed by terrorism or insurgency might be the same, the counterinsurgency reaction should vary. This is why the peculiarity of the Nigerian situation needs to be properly considered. The Nigerian situation shows that unlike other counterinsurgents or terrorist organizations, BH is not only not only flexible but semi-autonomous. They do not completely rely on their command structure for instruction. In the absence of a well-defined socio-political approach, the government's CT/COIN strategy will be ineffective and one-sided one, hence, the need for the recommendations of this thesis. The recommendations proffered are based on the three dimensions used in the analysis discussed in chapter 4.

Political Dimension

The NG's response to countering BH heavily depends on its political structure. While the country has soured on the wings of democracy since 1999 till date, the institutions that make up a functional democracy are weak or absent. For instance, the legislative and judicial arms of government are mostly controlled or influenced by either the executive arm or the politics of social divisions (like religion, tribe and race). The weaknesses of these institutions have made actions of government and assessment of leaders based more on who-one-knows, and not what-you-know. This makes it difficult for the people to hold their leaders accountable to unfavorable actions or policies because the leader is well connected to the powers that be. With the people as a key component of

winning an insurgency, the NG needs to build a strong political structure so as to gain the trust and confidence of the people.

The effects of weak political structures in Nigeria are too numerous to mention. However, one that is endemic in the country today is corruption. Corruption has caused a lot of harm to NG's response to BH activities. Poor pay incentives, lack of openness and transparency in public service, and absence of key anti corruption tools, a few reasons why corruption thrives in Nigeria. It can be argued that the failure of the state security agencies or the COIN forces to confront this menace can be attributed to incapacity, as a result of the NG's passive measures in tackling corruption. For the CT/COIN strategy to be effective there is the need for the NG to tackle the issue of corruption at all levels of government.

Furthermore, the need for a strong government structure or institution cannot be overemphasized. Some endemic vices like corruption, electoral rigging and imposition of political candidates, human right violations, poor freedom of the press, and lack of good governance all thrive because of weak institutions. This stresses the need for policies that will make government institutions and structures stronger. When this is achieved with a larger percentage of the populace, especially in the affected areas, not only will the people be more cooperative with the government's fight against BH, but leaders will be more responsible for their actions or inactions at all levels.

The issue of political godfatherism or the Oga factor (as earlier discussed in chapter 2), is one that limits Nigeria's acceleration in terms of policymaking and implementation. This informal system has, more or less, weakened Nigeria's socio-political structure because the Ogas seek to protect the parochial interests of their

subordinates and clients to ensure their continued fealty, rather than the nation's interests. The Ogas in Nigeria build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate the rest of the society (Albert 2005).

These political godfathers also use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who participates in politics and under what conditions, and are responsible for most of the pre-and post-election violence that we have seen in Nigeria. Literally, merit or competence takes the back stage in Nigeria's socio-political system because of the influence of this factor.

The role of such people is highly injurious to the advancement of popular, participatory democracy in Nigeria (Albert 2005). There is therefore the need for the NG to degrade the influence of political godfatherism or the Oga system in its political process in order to allow for a stronger formal government structure that will address the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

The NG needs to strengthen its foreign and military relationships or policies with its neighbors. Nigeria's immediate border neighbors are Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria's relationship with its neighbors has been weakened by politics, with most West African nations having long complained about the absence of Nigerian leadership (Campbell 2015). National security is and remains the sole aim of Nigeria's internal and foreign policies. The safety of its citizens, protection of Nigeria's interests, both at home and in the neighboring countries, as well as good relationship with other countries, still remains the country's focus in terms of these policies. However, the dynamics of security situations in Africa have altered the reasons for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives

regarding good neighborliness. The principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty has weakened the relationship between Nigeria and its neighbors.

Nigeria's CT/COIN strategy may not be effective without a concrete effort to cooperate with its neighbors. This is due to that fact that most of the border towns of the affected areas in Nigeria share similar, if not the same, cultural affiliation. Another reason for the need to cooperate is that BH terrorists cross the borders into safe havens in these neighboring countries, hence making it difficult to engage in a pursuit across international borders without cooperation or a bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement. An equally important reason for cooperation is the issue of porous borders between Nigeria and these countries. There is the need for all the countries involved (irrespective of their differences) to jointly and effectively protect these borders in order to canalize and subsequently neutralize the terrorist group. Consequently, the Nigeria Government should make efforts, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to improve its relationship with these countries, especially in the area of security.

Furthermore, a stronger relationship with Chad, Cameroon, and Niger will go a long way in tackling the BH menace in Nigeria. Politically, a bilateral formal agreement with its neighbors, which will be binding on all parties in each case, with international organizations being neutral and serving as trustees, will pave a way for cross-border cooperation militarily, socially and economically. If this factor is given due attention, it will be beneficial to the coalition efforts of Chad, Cameroun, Niger, and Nigeria in the fight against BH. Additionally, this will also go a long way in demonstrating the idea that Nigeria's neighbors are more of an asset than a liability.

Economic Dimension

Following an April 2014 statistical rebasing exercise, Nigeria emerged as Africa's largest economy, with a 2014 GDP estimated at US$ 479 billion. Nigeria overtook South Africa, whose GDP of $353 billion was previously counted the biggest on the continent and which is the only African member of the G20. Oil has been a dominant source of government revenues since the 1970s. Nigeria has been Africa's biggest drawer of direct foreign investment (FDI). However, the translation of these figures into measures that will positively impact the lives of the population can be said to be little, owing to the fact that over 62 percent of its citizens are still living in poverty (Central Intelligence Agency 2015b). Nigeria's President-elect, Mohammadu Buhari, identified with this aspect as a key factor in tackling BH. He stated that:

> [P]overty and ignorance are the causes of Boko Haram and needs to be addressed . . . . If you are starving and young and in search of answers as to why your life is so difficult, fundamentalism can be alluring. . . . Boko Haram offers . . . impressionable young people money and the promise of food, while the group's mentors twist their minds with fanaticism. The solution, Buhari says, is to offer an alternative. (Campbell 2015)

Nigeria's economic problems can be attributed to weak policies and reforms coupled with passive investment opportunities, minimal improvements in infrastructural development and a paralytic electricity supply that keeps businesses dependent on diesel-run generators. The effect of these weaknesses is a high rate of poverty and unemployment, low foreign investments and a high inflation rate. Unemployment figures in Nigeria are estimated at 41.6 percent, making it one of the highest in the world (Umoru 2011). The lack of employment opportunities coupled with a sense of hopelessness make the youth susceptible to violence, crime, and terrorism.

To address this issue, there is the need for a robust economic policy that will see the country's economy diversified and steadily growing. Nigeria's economy needs to grow to address the issues of massive poverty and youth unemployment. In addition to the growth of the economy, the NG needs to diversify its economy in order to reduce the pressure and over dependence on oil as its major source of revenue. Reliance on oil alone narrows the number of investments that can operate in the country. Therefore, the NG needs to also diversify its economy, improve its infrastructure and create employment in order to reduce poverty, increase literacy, and re-engineer economic change.

Furthermore, there is the need to encourage foreign investment in labor-intensive industries such as manufacturing, agro-industry and services. When this is achieved, there will be more job opportunities and a steady economy that will not flip-flop with the international oil market. In addition, foreign investors' attention will be drawn to the fact that while oil remains the biggest source of government revenue, and oil production is declining, Nigeria's agriculture, communications and service sectors are areas experiencing healthy growth and investment opportunities.

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Nigeria's poor social welfare system was discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, and subsequently identified as one of the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria. The BH terrorist group thrives on this weakness and the government's inability to address this situation. It is no news that most of the affected areas in the northeastern region are characterized by poor education, poor health care facilities and accessibility, high rates of poverty and unemployment as well as a poor transportation system. The big dichotomy between the

north and the south in terms of social welfare, basic amenities, infrastructure and education further strengthens this view.

Nigeria's socio-cultural diversity is a factor that presents a significant management challenge in terms of the distribution of power and resources among and between the various ethnic groups in the country. This has been a source of insecurity in Nigeria. Poverty is more endemic in the northern part of the country where agriculture and Islamic practices, such as resistance to western education, family planning, and medical vaccinations, and traditional lifestyles, such as nomadic cattle grazing, have worsened the effects of corruption, illiteracy, disease, and malnutrition resulting in poor living conditions and low life-expectancy.

By extension, it can be argued that this factor is a major contributor to the reason why some inhabitants of these affected areas avail themselves to BH for recruitment. This reason can also be argued as a driver to the indifference portrayed by some of the locals toward the NG's CT/COIN efforts. Consequently, improving the social welfare of these people is key in winning the hearts and minds of the people. Not only will this boost the NG's credibility, it stands also as one of the indispensable measures to successful counterterrorism operations in Nigeria.

The NG therefore needs to make deliberate efforts at improving the social welfare of the inhabitants of the areas affected by the activities of BH. These could include, but are not limited to: provision of employment; construction of schools and making education compulsory for all, up to secondary school level at the minimum; provision of a better health system; improved road infrastructure; farming aids; food; and clothes. Though the NG has already embarked on some of these projects, like construction of

schools, the current situation requires that more should be done in order to psychologically influence these people to support the government as required. The specific measures that President-elect Muhammadu Buhari, proposes are practical and within his authority and ability to implement. He stressed the need for a socio-political approach as key in the successful fight against BH when he stated that "the solution is . . . by boosting education, in particular for girls . . . my priorities: first, defeat Boko Haram and then reform education" (Campbell 2015).

There is the issue of a weak approach in addressing the poor sense of national pride in Nigeria. The country has a deep divide between religious and ethnic ties as well as a poor social image locally and internationally. This can be attributed to issues such as corruption, religious divides, intra and inter-ethnic rivalries as well as lack of trust for government and its citizens. Politics and policies are affected, to a large extent, based on these factors. Although, this is a trend that has been endemic since the pre-colonial era, shying away from it will only worsen an effective response against terrorism in Nigeria. The result will be leaders' selectively addressing issues within their domains either because they are not from the affected areas or not the same religion.

In March 1984, a military decree enacted the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) program. It was initiated and supported by the then military Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari. The program was aimed at instilling public morality, social order, civic responsibilities in Nigerians, and promote Nigerian nationalism. The program was broken into phases with the objectives of encouraging citizens to line up or queue for services and encouraging women to train their wards (as the culture then considered child raising a predominantly female skill). In addition, the program was to encourage hard

work and proper home training, which would groom future disciplined adults. The phases were focused on patriotism and eradicating economic sabotage and corruption. This program, like many others, was buoyed by the use of government owned media. However, today, this program has almost gone into extinction and contemporary Nigerian society is another home for indiscipline (Rotimi 2015).

A similar strategy needs to be adopted in stirring up a sense of national pride. The reawakening of a sense of patriotism will be beneficial in Nigeria's CT/COIN strategy as it will result to a high level of cooperation among Nigerians against terrorism. This will also facilitate a community-centric security strategy being adopted by the various communities in Nigeria aimed at denying Boko Haram members safe havens in their domains to plan and stage attacks. Additionally, the COIN forces will benefit from the sharing of information and intelligence with the people. It is therefore expedient for the Nigerian Government to concentrate on improving its image in the affected region by implementing measures that will bring about sustainable development in the region. It is often said that, action speaks louder than words. When the citizens see that their grievances are being addressed in any shape or form (especially security), the level of confidence and trust in government will increase.

Boko Haram uses religion, in particular, Islam, as a basis for gaining legitimacy, authority and support from the people, by carefully selecting and citing verses from the Holy Quran to support their mischief. However, their movement goes contrary to the tenets of Islam. According to the Holy Quran, Surah 2-136, Yusuf Ali: Say ye: "We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to (all) prophets from

their Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them: And we bow to Allah (in Islam).” This implies that the so-called volunteers are ignorant of the teachings and are easily manipulated into going against the instructions of the Quran, reasons being that they lack an in-depth knowledge about the teachings of Islam. It may also mean that there are some Islamic scholars who deliberately teach their followers to believe that non-Muslims deserve to die. These religious tenets need to be addressed, especially in the affected areas, in order to weaken this line of recruitment for the group. This will also help the Muslims in these areas to understand what true Islam teaches.

There is therefore the need to improve the capabilities of information and intelligence of the COIN forces in order to expose the Muslim clerics that instigate violence and extremism based on the contents of their messages. As a further recommendation, the umbrella of the Islamic Faithful in Nigeria should (as a matter of national security) vet the Muslim scholars in all the mosques in Nigeria and certify their credibility before they are allowed to preach. Profiles of preachers, Islamic schools and colleges should be reviewed and forwarded to the government in order to mitigate this anomaly. On the other hand, the government should make concrete and consistent efforts to work with Nigerian Muslim leaders to ensure that only certified preachers are allowed to teach in the mosques. These efforts are will yield positive results. When this is done, the number of extremist teachers will be reduced and by extension, this will discourage people from availing themselves for recruitment by the BH terrorist group. It may also dissuade both current and potential supporters as well as financiers of the group.

Summary of Recommendations

In order for the CT/COIN strategy to be more effective, the NG should:

1. Build a strong political structure and institutions in order to address weak governance, judicial and legislative systems as well as gain the trust and confidence of the people.
2. Degrade the influence of political godfatherism or the Oga system in the political process in order to allow for a stronger formal government structure that will address the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria.
3. Strengthen its foreign and military relationships or policies with her neighbors to foster political, economic social and military cooperation, as well as ensure protection of international borders in order to sever the BH cross-border activities.
4. Introduce effective economic policies and reforms so as to ensure a steady growth of the economy, increase the employment level, reduce poverty and attract foreign investments or investors.
5. Diversify its economy so as to reduce over dependence on oil as well as encourage other sectors like agriculture, science and technology and services.
6. Encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in labor-intensive industries such as manufacturing agro-industry and services.
7. Improve its social welfare systems to make up for lapses in education, health and infrastructural development.
8. Reintroduce programs that will rejuvenate a sense of national pride, discipline and positive image nationally and internationally.

9. Improve the capabilities of information and intelligence of the COIN forces in order to expose extremist clerics that instigate violence and extremism based on the content of their messages.

Conclusion

Terrorism remains a potent threat to Nigeria's national security and the international community as a whole despite the NG's efforts in tackling the menace for the past six years. The rise in number, sophistication, geographical expansion, and array of targets that have been successfully attacked by Boko Haram have increased since 2009. Not only has the group expanded its operations beyond Nigeria's borders, it has also gained international recognition and by pledging its allegiance to ISIS. The obstinacy of the group has resulted in the group's increased operational capacity, hence, pointing out gaps in the current NG's CT/COIN strategy to bring the insurgency to an end.

This thesis is not tended towards disproving the need for a military aspect in the fight against BH. Rather, this research identified the gaps in the reactive and heavy military approach in NG's CT/COIN strategy (which has made the one-sided approach less effective), with a view to offering recommendations as to the need for a robust socio-political approach in making the strategy more effective.

Relevance to Field of Study

Combating terrorism and insurgency requires a more proactive and grand socio-political strategy. The limitations and drawbacks of the Nigerian military's fight against Boko Haram are clear, especially in light of the increase in successful attacks on targets

and indiscriminate killings of law abiding citizens in north-eastern region. Events that followed have shown that success in tackling the problem of Boko Haram does not solidly depend on a purely military approach. A socio-political component is required to solidify the success of the military in order to achieve long term strategic gains.

There are no simple solutions to combating BH activities in Nigeria. However, a conscious attempt to compliment hard power military operations with soft power within the elements of national power would hasten the elimination of BH and put Nigeria on a path of peace and development. NG's soft power approach in combating BH should be framed from a socio-political perspective of a poverty reduction strategy that seeks to address issues of poverty, inequality, and unemployment as key factors that could lead to acts of insurgency and terror.

Therefore, it is important to state that, conditioned by this dominant reality, the aim of this thesis can best be realized in a democratic Nigerian state that provides for and protects its citizens, and guards against a purely militarized response to socio-political discontents, which still abound in most parts of the country. This research has contributed to the field of study with respect to the current CT/COIN operations going on in Nigeria. Consequently, it is expected that the recommendations made in this research could be applied not only to Nigeria, but also to other places facing a similar situation.

Recommendations for Further Study and Analysis

Different scholars and analysts have written from different perspectives on Terrorism in general, and Boko Haram (BH) in specific, based on several factors. This has made the study on BH very challenging not only because of the different

perspectives, but also because of the dynamism of the group's activities. The reports on the group's activities like suicide bombings, kidnappings or hostage taking, armed robbery and outright attacks on communities, government officials, schools as well as COIN forces have been almost on a daily basis. These factors contribute to the difficulty in the study of terrorism in Nigeria.

This thesis was limited by, among other factors, the author's inability to assess some classified documents, as well as conducting interviews with any former member of Boko-Haram or residents living in the hotspots of the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (Nigeria). Future researchers should, by any possible means, develop strategies that will enable them get first-hand experiences shared by former insurgents, residents caught up in the middle of the insurgency and former captors of the group. This would no doubt give more credibility to data directly used in this research to mark the variables used to analyze the effectiveness of Nigeria's CT/COIN strategy.

Furthermore, the grading of most of the variables used in this thesis was not based on a comprehensive public opinion poll or collation of official data. Rather, the variables were rated based on the feelings and beliefs of the citizens in the affected areas as documented in some Nigerian electric and print media. While a number of polls were analyzed in this study, they did not necessarily define the exact population that finds itself in a particular area of COIN operations and insurgency, but tended to reflect a holistic opinion. This author was unable to accurately draw conclusions on the opinion of the people in the affected region from those of the general population. The limitations of using surveys as a reliable research method is another issue on its own that could be debated at length, and it is beyond the scope of this study. But it should be remembered

that polls are only that—random samples of opinions and may not accurately reflect actual public sentiment.

Therefore, the author recommends that researchers on further studies of this topic should consider grading the selected variables in conjunction with some agencies in Nigeria in order to get a more comprehensive public opinion poll or official data on a particular issue. As a form of reiteration, efforts should be made to get credible information on BH activities from former BH members and the residents of the affected areas, especially Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (Nigeria). In addition, the experiences and testimonies of freed captors (like the women, girls and children freed from BH camps in Sambisa forest) will be of advantage to researchers in order to give more credibility to their research.

REFERENCE LIST

Adesoji, Abimbola. 2011. “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State.” *Africa Today* 57, no. 4 (Summer): 98-119.

Afegbua Issa. 2014. “Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Prospects.” Department of Public Administration, Lagos State University. December 3. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://chrisdonasco.blogspot.com/2014/12/conflicts-and-political-instability-in.html.

Africa is a Country. 2014. “Who are Boko Haram, and How did they Come to be? Accessed May 4, 2015. http://africasacountry.com/who-is-boko-haram-and-how-did-they-come-to-be/.

Ajayi, A. I. 2012. “’Boko Haram’ and Terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and Explanatory Notes.” *Global Advanced Research Journal of History, Political Science and International Relations* 1, no. 5 (July): 103-107. Accessed December 3, 2014. http://garj.org/garjhpsir/index.htm.

Ajayi, Gboyega. 1990. “Government and Religious Patronage in Contemporary Nigeria (1980-1989): Implications for the Stability of the Nation.” *Zeitschrift fur Afrikastudien*, no. 7/8: 55-65.

Akande, Tunji. 2014. “Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: A Situation Analysis.” Brookings, September 23. Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/09/23-youth-unemployment-nigeria-akande.

Albert, Isaac Olawale. 2005. “Explaining ‘Godfatherism’ in Nigerian Politics.” *African Sociological Review* 9, no. 2: 79-105.

Aldis, Anne, and Graeme Herd, eds. 2006. *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter- Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.

Alexander, Yonah. 2006. *Counterterrorism Strategies: Success and Failures of Six Nations*. Herndon, VA: Potomac Books.

Ani, Chukwuma. 2014. “Combating Terrorism: A Case Study of Nigeria Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group.” Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College.

Anti-Defamation League (ADL). 2014. “Boko Haram: The Emerging Jihadist Threat in West Africa.” May 9. Accessed May 20, 2015. http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/boko-haram-jihadist-threat-africa.html.

Artofanderson.com. 2015. Map of Nigeria.” Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.artofanderson.com/map-of-nigeria-showing-states-and-cities/.

Bala-Gbogbo, Elisha. 2011. “Nigeria’s Oil Revenue Rose 46% to $59 Billion in 2010.” Bloomberg Business, April 14. Accessed May 11, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-14/nigeria-s-oil-revenue-rose-46-to-59-billion-in-2010-on-improved-security.

Bamidele, Oluwaseun. 2012. “Boko Haram Catastrophic Terrorism-An Albatross to National Peace, Security and Sustainable Development in Nigeria.” *Nigeria Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 14, no. 1.

BBC Africa. 2009. “Nigeria Offers Militants Amnesty.” June 26. Accessed May 26, 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8118314.stm.

———. 2011. “Abuja Attack: Car Bomb Hits Nigeria UN Building. August 27. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957.

———. 2015a. “Boko Haram Attack: What Happened in Baga?” February 2. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30987043.

———. 2015b. “Nigeria's Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to the Islamic State.” March 7. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538.

———. 2015c. “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?” May 4. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501.

BBC News. 2004. “Al-Qaeda’s Origins and Links.” July 20. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1670089.stm.

———. 2014. “Who, What, Why: Exactly what does the Phrase Boko Haram Mean.” Accessed December 3, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-27390954.

Bibliotheca Alexandrina, SMWIPM Peace Studies Institute, and Strategic Foresight Group, with support from Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2006. “International Workshop on Global Extremism, Terror, and Response Strategies.” Alexandria, Egypt, August 6-7.

Biz Shifts. 2011. “Impact of War on Terrorism on The Economy and Business: We are Spending Trillions + casualties + TSA…and Counting.” Accessed December 3, 2014. http://bizshifts-trends.com/2011/06/27/impact-of-%E2%80%98war-on-terrorism%E2%80%99-on-the-economy-business-we-are-spending-trillions-casualties-tsa-and-counting/.

BlackPast.org. 2015. “Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).” Accessed May 20, 2015. http://www.blackpast.org/gah/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970.

Bremer, Paul L. 1987. *Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics*. Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, November.

Brock, Joe. 2011. “Nigerian Islamist sect Claims Bomb Attack: Report.” *Reuters*. Accessed December 3, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-nigeria-bomb-idUSTRE75G1G020110617.

Brynjar, Lia, with Katja Skjolberg. 2004. *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature*. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

Bures, Oldrich. 2011. *EU Counterterrorism Policy*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Byman, Daniel. 2007. *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad*. New York: Wiley.

Campbell, John. 2010. “Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink.” *Council on Foreign Relation*s. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-dancing-brink/p22833?cid=rss-books-nigeria__dancing_on_the_brink-060113.

———. 2011. *Nigeria Dancing on the Brink.* United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

———. 2015. “Buhari’s Strategy for Stopping Boko Haram.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 16. Accessed May 16, 2015. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/04/16/buharis-strategy-for-stopping-boko-haram/.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2013. *CIA World Fact Book 2014*. Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 9781626360730.

———. 2015a. “Algeria.” Accessed January 17, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.

———. 2015b. “Nigeria.” Accessed June 5, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html.

Chothia, Farouk. 2015. “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?” *BBC News*, May 4. Accessed May 13, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501.

CNN. 2015a. “Boko Haram Purportedly Pledges Allegiance to ISIS.” March 9, 2015. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/07/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-isis/.

———. 2015b. “Boko Haram's Pledge of Allegiance to ISIS: What it Means.” March 10. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/intl_tv/pham-boko-haram-isis/index.html.

———. 2015c. “ISIS Leader Purportedly Accepts Boko Haram's Pledge of Allegiance.” March 12. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/middleeast/isis-boko-haram/.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2015. CFR Backgrounders." March 15. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739

Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. "The Cause of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (July): 379-399. Accessed March 1, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/421717.

Danjibo, N. D. 2009. "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." Accessed December 5, 2014. http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N-_D-_DANJIBO_-_Islamic_ Fundamentalism_and_Sectarian_Violence_The_Maitatsine_and_Boko_Haram_C rises_in_Northern_Nigeria.pdf.

Dempsey, Thomas. 2006. "Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions." Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Department of State. 2013. "Legislative Requirements and Key Terms." Accessed December 3, 2014. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf.

Dictionary.com. 2015. "Caliph." Accessed November 16, 2014. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/caliph.

Edogiawerie, Morris K. O. 2013. "Democracy, Justice and the Quest for Socio-Political Order in Nigeria." *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences* 2, no. 1: 53-66. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://infinitypress.info/index.php/jsss/article/viewFile/37/37.

Elkaim, Zachary. 2013. "Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of the Insurgency in Nigeria." ICT Working Papers. Accessed December 5, 2014. http://www.ictwps.com/index.cfm/working-papers/boko-haram-the-rise-success-and-continued-efficacy-of-the-insurgency-in-nigeria/.

Encyclopedia of Earth. 2007. "Energy Profile of Nigeria." October 11. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152513/.

Faul, Michelle. 2014. "Nigeria: Economy $510B, Biggest in Africa." *USA Today,* April 6. Accessed May 16, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ business/2014/04/06/nigeria-economy-510-billion-biggest-in-africa/7389395/.

Forest, James J. F. 2012. JSOU Report 12-5, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram.* MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University.

Frechtling, Joy, and Laure Sharp. 1997. *User-Friendly Handbook for Mixed Method Evaluations*. Directorate for Education and Human Resources. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1997/nsf97153/start.htm.

Galula, David. 1964. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. London: Pall Mall.

Global Non-Profit Information Networks. 2015. “Counterterrorism Policies Discourage Charities from Attacking the Root Causes of Terrorism.” Accessed February 8, 2015. http://www.gwob.net/advocasy/pdf/gni_091508-s.pdf.

Global Security. 2013. “Nigeria-Niger Delta.” Last modified March 8. Accessed May 11, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nigeria-2.htm.

Grothaus, Nick. 2011. “Causes of Terrorism.” Hand of Reason. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://handofreason.com/2011/featured/causes-of-terrorism.

Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Haider, Huma., ed. 2007. *Drivers of Extremism*. Birmingham, AL: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

Hanson, Stephanie. 2007. “MEND: The Niger Deltaâ€™s Umbrella Militant Group.” *Council on Foreign Relations,* March 22. Accessed May 20, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group/p12920.

Holy Quran. Accessed April 28, 2015. http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=2&verse=136English Translation.

Imobighe, Thomas. 2006. “Combating Terrorism: An Integrated Conflict Management Approach.” In *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism an African Perspective*, edited by Thomas A. Imobighe and Agatha N. T. Eguavoen, 30-36. Ibadan, Nigeria: Heinemann Education Books PLC.

Institute for Security Studies. 2011. “Nigeria: Security Situation Deteriorates as Government Lacks a Clear Response.” All Africa. November 10. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://allafrica.com/stories/201111100285.html?page=2.

IRIN News. 2015. “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian Government-Boko Haram Dialogue.” May 20. Accessed May 20, 2015. http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/analysis-hurdles-to-nigerian-government-boko-haram-dialogue.

Jakarta Globe. 2009. “The Root Cause of terrorism? It’s Not Poverty or Lack of Education. ” Accessed December 3, 2014. http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/the-root-cause-of-terrorism-its-not-poverty-or-lack-of-education/.

Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. 2012a. “Boko Haram.” August 14. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Boko-Haram-Nigeria.html.

———. 2012b. “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).” May 10. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Movement-for-the-Emancipation-of-the-Niger-Delta-MEND-Nigeria.html.

Joint Chief of Staff. 2009. Joint Publication 3-26, *Counterterrorism*. Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chief of Staff.

Kitson, Frank. 1977. *Bunch of Five*. London: Faber and Faber.

Knobel, Brooke. 2013. "Insurgencies and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria." Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College (Draft).

Kruglanski, Arie W., and Shira Fishman. 2009. "Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis." *Social Issues and Policy Review* 3, no. 1: 1-44.

Kwalja. Chris. 2014. "Caught on the Brink- Critical Reflection on Nigeria's Counter-Insurgency/Terrorism Strategy." Centre for Security Governance. May 6. Accessed April 5, 2015. http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/05/06/caught-on-the-brink-critical-reflections-on-nigerias-counter-insurgencyterror-strategy/.

Langer, Armin, R., Abdul Mustapha, and Frances Stewart. 2007. *Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire: Issues and Policies*. CRISE Working Paper No 70. University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House.

Mantzikos, Ioannis, ed. 2013. *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crises*. Bristol, UK: e-International Relations.

Masters, Daniel. 2009. "The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Religious, Separatist, or Something Else?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3: 8-14. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncw/f/mastersd2008-1.pdf.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. 1991. *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO, Library of Congress. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/9.htm.

Murshed, Mansoob S., and Sarah Pavan. 2009. "Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe." Research Working Paper 16, The Netherlands, Institute of Social Service. Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.papers.ssrn.c.m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=148883.

Nagl, John A. 2002. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Netanyahu, Benjamin. 1986. *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.

New York Times. 2010. "Far From Gulf, A Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old." June 16. Accessed May 10, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html?_r=0.

———. 2011. “Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Building in Nigeria.” August 26. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/africa/27nigeria.html.

Nigerian Government. 2011. *National Counter Terrorism Strategy for Nigeria*. Draft yet to be passed into Law.

Nwolise, Osisioma. 2004. “Terrorism: A Deadly Threat To Democracy, Good Governance, Development, National And International Security in The 21st Century: What Is To Be Done?” Research Paper, National War College, Abuja.

———. 2005. *Terrorism: What is to be done about an Emerging Threat to Democracy, Good Governance, Development, and Security of Nations in the 21st Century?* Online. Ibadan: Institute Français de Recherche en Afrique. Accessed August 17, 2014. http://books.openedition.org/ifra/800?lang=it.

Olusola, Olasupo. 2013. “The Consequences of Militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.” *JORIND* 11, no. 2 (December): 149-150. Accessed December 5, 2014. http://www.transcampus.org/JORINDV11Dec2013/Jorind%20Vol11%20No2%20Dec%20Chapter18.pdf.

Onuoha, Freedom. 2010. The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained. *African Security Review* 19, no. 2 (June): 54-67. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20.

Osakwe, Chukwuma, and Ubong Essien Umoh. 2013. “The Military and Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria.” In *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, edited by Ozoemenam Mbachu and Umar M. Bature, 391-406. Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers.

Oyovbaire, Sam E. 1980. “The Atlantic Ocean, Gaddafi, Maitatsine and Rice-On National Security and Nigeria’s African Policy.” *Nigerian Journal of International Studies* 4, no. 1-2: 16-21.

Paden, John. 2015. *Religion and Conflict in Nigeria*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, February. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR359-Religion-and-Conflict-in-Nigeria.pdf.

Paul, Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill. 2010a. *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies.* Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute.

———. 2010b. *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html.

Prabha, Kshitij. 2008. “Defining Terrorism.” *Strategic Analysis* 24, no. 11 (2000): 25-135. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr-08.html.

Radio National. 2014. “Reported Civilian Deaths in Boko Haram Attacks.” September 2010-April 2014.” May 22. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/rvn-a174835252civiliandeathinboko624jpg/5471570.

Raliat Ahmed. 2012. “Nigeria: Is Al-Qaeda in Nation?” All Africa. January 9. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201001111249.html.

Results. 2011. “West Africa Map.” April 19. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://blog.results.org.uk/2011/04/20/the-nigerian-elections-highlighting-girls-education/west-africa-map/.

Riegler, Thomas. 2011. “Addressing Root-Causes: The Example of Bruno Kreisky and Autria’s Confrontation of Middle Eastern Terrorism.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, no. 2 (May): 69-72.

Roggio, Bill. 2014. “ISIS Announces Formation of Caliphate, Rebrands as 'Islamic State’.” *The Long War Journal*. June 29. Accessed June5, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/isis_announces_formation_of_ca.php.

Rotimi, Ogundana Michael. 2015. “Can We Bring Back ‘War Against Indiscipline’?” The Nigerian Voice, May 15. Accessed May 16, 2015. http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/179340/1/can-we-bring-back-war-against-indiscipline.html.

Sandole, Dennis J. D. 2004. “The New Terrorism: Causes, Conditions, and Conflict Resolution.” Accessed February 8, 2015. http://scar.gmu.edu/sept11/article14.pdf.

Sanico, Grace, and Makoto Kinaka. 2008. “Terrorism and Deterrence Policy with Transnational Support.” *Defense and Peace Economics* 19, no. 2 (April): 155-167. Accessed March 1, 2013. doi: 10.1080/10242690701505419.

Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman. 1988. *Political Terrorism.* New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Sedgwick, Mark. 2007. “Inspiration and Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 2 (February): 97-112. Accessed February 8, 2015. https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=239377.

Sheehan, Ivan S. 2009. *Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threats?* Boston: University of Massachusetts.

Sinai, Joshua. 2008. “Resolving a Terrorist Insurgency by Addressing Its Root Causes.” Accessed February 13, 2015. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-71613-8_5.

Stewart, Frances. 2010. “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict.” Centre for Researach on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, January. Accessed May 2, 2015. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Stewart.pdf.

The Economist. 2014. “Africa’s new Number One.” April 10. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-indeed-wonder-so-are-its-still-huge.

The Guardian. 2013. “£1bn a Month: The Spiralling Cost of Oil Theft in Nigeria.” October 5. Accessed May 10, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/oct/06/oil-theft-costs-nigeria.

———. 2015. “Nigerian Army Frees Hundreds More Women and Girls from Boko Haram.” May 1. Accessed May 13, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/02/nigerian-women-girls-boko-haram-rebel.

The Muslim 500. 2015. “Amirul Mu’minin Sheikh as Sultan Muhammadu Sa’adu Abubakar III.” Accessed May 15, 2015. http://themuslim500.com/profile/saadu-abubakar-iii-sultan-sokoto.

Udounwa, Solomon Effiong, Colonel, Nigerian Army. 2013. “Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria.” Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College.

Umoru, Henry. 2011, “20m Nigerian Youths Unemployed–FG.” Vanguard, December 9. Accessed May 16, 2015. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/20m-nigerian-youths-unemployed-fg/#sthash.5UX3OWVr.dpuf.

United Nations Peacekeeping. 2015. “Troop and Police Contributors.” Accessed January 5, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

U.S. Congress. House. 2011. Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. *BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland*. 112th Cong., 1st sess.

———. 2012. Committee on US House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights. *U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa’s Troubled Titan.* 112th Cong., 2d sess.

Walker, Andrew. 2008. “What Is Boko Haram?” Special Report 308, United States Institute of Peace. Accessed December 13, 2014. http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR308.pdf.

Wilkinson, Paul. 1974. *Political Terrorism*. London: Macmillan.

Word Press. 2012. “Niger Delta Amnesty Program Fails to End Militancy.” Accessed May 6, 2015. https://nigerdeltapolitics.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/niger-delta-amnesty-program-fails-to-end-militancy/.

Zabadi, Istifanus S. 2006. “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from Asia and the Middle East.” In *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism an African Perspective*, edited by Thomas A. Imobighe and Agatha N. T. Eguavoen, 21-35. Ibadan, Nigeria: Heinemann Education Books.

Zainal, Zaidah. 2007. “Case Study as a Research Method.” Jurnal Kemanusiaan. Malaysia: Universiti Teknologi. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://eprints.utm.my/8221/1/ZZainal2007-Case_study_as_a_Research.pdf.